FEBRUARY 1974

MONTHLY REVIEW

N INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOLUME 25

9

Capitalism, for Worse

PAUL M. SWEEZY

Greece: The November Uprising

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

1973: Year of Europe

RICHARD Du BOFF

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MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly except July and August, when bimonthly, and copyright © 1974, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 62 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y. 10011.
Telephone: (212) 691-2555.
Europe: Frances Kelly, 20 Garrick Street, London, W.C. 2.
Telephone: 01-240-3151; 01-240-2300.
MR Edizione Italiana: viale Orazio Flacco 15, Bari 70124.
Telephone: 241919, 246157.
MR In Spanish: Apdo. Nal. 8004, Bogota, Colombia.

Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, 118 High Street, Nutley, N. J.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—$9 in the U.S.; $10 foreign. (Institutions and libraries—U.S. $12; foreign $13.)
By 1st Class mail—U.S. $14; elsewhere $16.
By air mail—No. America $16; So. America and Europe $20.
By air mail—Asia (Incl. USSR), Africa, Australia $22.

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

The *New York Times* of January 13th carried a report from Santiago that a number of prominent Chilean doctors who were associated in one way or another with the Allende regime had been arrested on such charges as that they were setting up underground hospitals—which probably means that they were trying to bring decent health care to the shanty-town dwellers who make up a large proportion of all Chilean (and other Latin American) cities. We have since been informed that the accused doctors face prison terms of up to 15 years. Among those arrested was Dr. Gustavo Molina who was the first MR subscriber in Chile and a warm personal friend ever since Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy visited Chile eleven years ago this winter. Dr. Molina lived many years in the United States, was active in international and inter-American health organizations, and played a prominent part, along with his close friend Dr. Salvador Allende, in setting up the Chilean health system which, next to the Cuban system, was the most advanced in Latin America. Nothing could more clearly reveal the utterly barbaric character of the military-fascist gang now in power in Chile than its treatment of men like Gustavo Molina and his colleagues in the Chilean medical profession who fought against all sorts of difficulties and obstacles to bring the benefits of modern medical science to the Chilean masses. We hope that this latest outrage will move more and more people in this country and abroad to participate actively in the movement to protest the policies of the junta and in support of its victims. If you want to give money, which is badly needed for many purposes, you

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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CAPITALISM, FOR WORSE

By Paul M. Sweezy

In the spring a series of articles appeared on the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times* under the title "Capitalism, for Better or Worse." Subsequently these articles, together with several which did not appear in the *Times,* were collected by *Times* economics editor Leonard Silk and have just been published by Quadrangle Press under the title *Capitalism: The Moving Target* (cloth $5.95, paper $1.95). The following piece is one of those added to make the book.—The Editors

With few exceptions the economists of the capitalist countries, liberal and conservative alike, are agreed that in the nearly four decades since the publication of Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* governments have been in possession of, and have successfully utilized, means to control the level of economic activity and prevent the occurrence of serious depressions. To quote Harvard's Nobel Prize winning economist Kenneth J. Arrow:

> The new economic ideas of Keynes and his disciples have been translated into policy with almost unprecedented speed. The idea that the state, through its decisions to spend, tax, and regulate the supply of money, could reduce unemployment to levels far lower than those in the depths of previous depressions was accepted among both economists and political leaders, and has shown itself to work in practice with great success. In every advanced country, the post-World War II record is like that of a new economy. (*New York Times,* March 26, 1973)

Let us look for a moment at the U.S. record (I will return to the others later on). It is true that since World War II there have been no depressions comparable to that of the 1930s. But is this because economists and political leaders have put their heads together and decided upon appropriate spending, tax, and

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monetary policies to head one off every time it threatened? Or is it because there has been a tremendous increase in the general level of government spending, with armaments and war playing by far the largest part? (I presume that neither the economists nor the political leaders would wish to claim that the military spending is merely the form taken by Keynesian ideas when put into practice.)

To these questions our economist friends would probably reply that while for overriding political or foreign-policy reasons the requisite amount of government spending has in fact been for military purposes, if this had not been the case it would have been possible to spend a great deal more for welfare objectives, with much the same economic results. In their eyes, the theory of the controllability of the level of economic activity is therefore vindicated regardless of what the money is spent on.

If this were really so, however, would we not expect that the controllers, helped by the large military budget, would have had an easy time maintaining a reasonably satisfactory level of economic activity throughout the postwar period? Surely with 20 percent or more of the American people living below the officially defined poverty line and with such projects as decent low-cost housing, pollution control, and mass transportation crying out for vastly increased public outlays, there has never been any lack of worthy purposes for the controllers to turn their attention to. And yet it is a notorious fact that even in boom periods, as at the time of writing in June 1973, officially counted unemployment amounts to 5 percent or more of the labor force. Taking facts like this into account, one could be pardoned for suspecting that the whole "controllability" idea is a myth and that the military budget is after all the only rational explanation of the relatively (i.e., relatively to the 1930s) favorable economic record of the postwar period.

In order to test this hypothesis, my colleague Harry Magdoff and I conducted an "experiment."* Using common sense and generally conservative estimating methods, we calculated for the year 1970 the number of workers who were either unemployed or directly and indirectly dependent on military spend-

* Reported in detail in "Economic Stagnation and the Stagnation of Economics," MONTHLY REVIEW (April 1971).

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ing. We then added these figures and compared the result with the number of unemployed in 1938. (It should be noted that both 1970 and 1938 were years of recession following a long period of cyclical upswing and should therefore be fairly comparable.)

The first problem was to get an estimate of real, as distinct from officially counted, unemployment, since everyone familiar with the subject knows that there is a large discrepancy.* Working from official data on labor force participation rates, which were steadily declining for male workers during most of the 1950s and 1960s, and making an adjustment for involuntary part-time workers, we concluded that a conservative estimate of real unemployment was 8.1 million (9.4 percent of what would have been the labor force if jobs had been available). To this we added those in the armed forces (2.9 million), civilian employees of the Defense Department (1.2 million), those employed in producing goods for the Defense Department (3 million), and those employed because of what economists call the multiplier effect, i.e., workers employed in satisfying the demand generated by the incomes of those directly employed by the military budget (7.1 million). These items total 22.3 million. This is just over 25 percent of the 1970 labor force adjusted to include those not officially counted as unemployed.

This compares with an official unemployment figure of 19.0 percent in 1938. However, if we make adjustments for hidden unemployment at that time and add to the expanded total the relatively small number of defense-related employed, we would probably come up with a figure somewhere around 30 percent to compare with the 25 percent in 1970. All of which leads to the conclusion that, apart from military spending, things were a bit better in 1970 than in 1938. But not much, and certainly nowhere near enough to sustain the thesis that the economists and politicians are in effective control of the economy.

If my Keynesian friends wish to dispute these facts or estimates, I would be happy to hear from them. I confess, however, that I do not expect to. They like to talk about the record,

* See, for example, the article on unemployment entitled "6 Pct. Is Only the Tip of the Iceberg" by A. H. Raskin in the *New York Times* "Review of the Week" section, June 25, 1972.

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but they are shy about subjecting it to a concrete historical analysis. In this connection it is worth noting, if only in passing, that they have not yet come up with a coherent theory of the Great Depression and why it was so much worse than any previous capitalist depression. Need I add that without such a theory it is quite impossible to provide any rational analysis of what might have happened in the postwar period in the absence of vastly expanded military spending?

At this point the Keynesians, with remarkable unanimity, shift their ground. What about the other advanced capitalist countries, they ask, and especially Germany and Japan, the two with the best growth and employment records and the lowest levels of military spending?

It is impossible to answer this question adequately in a brief essay, especially since, to the best of my knowledge, no one, and least of all the Keynesians, has made a serious effort to do so. I can therefore only indicate the general lines along which I believe an attempt at an answer should proceed.

Most fundamental here is the fact, too often forgotten by social scientists each working in his or her narrow specialty, that capitalism is a global system and not a collection of separate national economies. What happens in any part of the system affects to some extent what happens in all the others; and if the part in question happens to be by far the largest in the system, as is the case with the United States in world capitalism, the effect on some or all of the other parts is likely to be large and even decisive. The question, then, is to what extent the performance of the world capitalist economy, and especially the economies of Germany and Japan, has been determined by the relative prosperity of the United States during this period.

It is, I believe, beyond dispute that both the German and the Japanese economic "miracles" were launched in the boom which accompanied the Korean War, i.e., as a direct result of U.S. military spending and involvement. In the case of Germany, Heinz Abosch has written: "For the West German economy, the Korean War proved to be a remarkable stimulant: while the big industrial powers had to step up the production of armaments, Germany, still subject to the restrictions of the Potsdam Agreement, was able to increase her entire industrial

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output, thanks to the orders that poured in from all sides. As Professor [Henry] Wallich remarks: 'It was sparks from the Korean War that set German exports alight.'" * What was true for Germany was even more so for Japan which was the rear staging area for U.S. forces fighting in Korea and a direct recipient of large military orders. "In terms of the growth situation," writes Professor Tsuru, "the Korean conflict and the subsequent maintenance of 'special procurement' demand was a distinct boon."**

Of course it would not be possible to establish so close a continuing dependence of the German and Japanese economies on U.S. military spending. The booms touched off by Korea had much else to feed on: repair of war damage, renovation of capital equipment, and, perhaps most important, a veritable binge of "automobilization" similar to that which had sustained the U.S. economy in the 1920s. But continuing strong demand for German and Japanese exports remained a *sine qua non* of the prosperity of these countries, and it is difficult to believe that this export demand would have held up if the U.S. economy had once again sunk into a condition of low-level stagnation such as prevailed in the 1930s. It is well to remember that in that earlier period it was only military spending, first in Japan and Germany and only later in the United States, which pulled the capitalist world out of the Great Depression. In the postwar period I would argue that it has been military spending (plus other similarly motivated outlays such as economic subsidies to puppet and client states), so far largely but by no means exclusively centered in the United States, which has prevented the capitalist world from sinking into a new Great Depression. As an historical interpretation of these strife-ridden decades, I submit that this makes vastly more sense than the notion that the postwar performance of world capitalism has been the brainchild of economists aided and abetted by wise

* Heinz Abosch, *The Menace of the Miracle* (Monthly Review Press, 1963), p. 79.

** Shigeto Tsuru, *Essays in Economic Development,* Economic Research Series No. 9 (Tokyo, 1968), p. 168. "Special Procurement" was the name given to U.S. purchases for military and related purposes. According to Professor Tsuru's figures (pp. 156-157) this item averaged 34.2 percent of Japan's total receipts from foreign sales of goods and services in the years 1951-1953.

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political leaders. Economists may like to think that they are powerful, and political leaders that they are wise. But the sad truth is that there is precious little evidence to support these amiable conceits. True, they play a role, but not the one they think they play or would like to play; rather their role is that of instruments and agents of elemental forces generated by a blind and self-contradictory economic system which no one can control.

The real question to which economists ought to address themselves, but consistently refuse to do so, is why capitalism in the twentieth century has such a powerful tendency to stagnation that it requires increasingly massive forms of public and private waste to keep itself going at all. (As every reasonably sensitive observer of contemporary capitalism knows, military spending is only the leading species of a large genus.) Basically, the reason was stated by Marx with both eloquence and clarity more than a hundred years ago when he wrote: *"The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself.* It is the fact that capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and closing point, as the motive and aim of production, that production is merely production for *capital,* and not vice versa, the means of production mere means for an ever-expanding system of the life process for the benefit of the *society* of producers." * To put the point in another way, as long as the driving forces of production are profit and the expansion of profit-making enterprises, and as long as the incomes of working people are held down precisely to make possible an increase in profits and a more rapid expansion of enterprises, so long will the growth of society's power to produce tend to outstrip its power to consume. And if this contradiction is deeper and more pervasive today than it was in Marx's time, the reason is that in the intervening period the process of concentration and centralization of capital—which he recognized as inevitable features of capitalist development—has gone so far that dominant monopolies today have the power not only to exploit their own workers but all other strata of society as well, thus expanding the gap between wealth at one pole and poverty at the other, at the very time when there is, or soon could be, ample productive power to

* *Capital,* vol. 3, Kerr edition, p. 293. Italics in the original.

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provide everyone without exception with the means to a decent human livelihood.

Under these circumstances economists have taken upon themselves the task of hiding the facts, of making the uncontrollable appear under control, of rationalizing a system which condemns hundreds of millions of people to lives of despair and starvation, and which through its unrestrained profligacy and violence threatens the very continuation of life on earth. It is not a task I envy them.

If man draws all his knowledge, sensation, etc., from the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, the empirical world must be arranged so that in it man experiences and gets used to what is really human and becomes aware of himself as man. If correctly understood interest is the principle of all morals, man's private interest must be made to coincide with the interest of humanity. If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality, crime must be not punished in the individual, but the anti-social source of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by his surroundings, his surroundings must be made human. If man is social by nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the strength of his nature must be measured not by the strength of separate individuals but by the power of society.

Karl Marx, *The Holy Family*

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GREECE: THE MEANING OF THE NOVEMBER UPRISING

BY ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

A genuine popular uprising took place in Greece on the night of November 16, 1973. It has altered permanently the political trajectory of the country. Not only did it spell the end of the U.S.-sponsored experiment of Papadopoulos in "limited," "responsible," or "guided" democracy; it also laid the foundations for the development of a truly massive people's liberation movement.

With some notable exceptions, the world press played down the event. It was presented as a limited though intense university student rebellion. Actually, as will become clear further on, it amounted to a genuine, if short-lived, social and political revolution. Not much has been written, either, about the incredible brutality of the police, barely matched by similar acts of the Chilean army in Santiago last September.

One example suffices. As ambulances took away the wounded from the scene of battle, police would block their way, stop them, drag wounded and doctors alike onto the pavement, and then proceed to beat them mercilessly. Then they would climb into the ambulances and drive on through the crowds—and as unsuspecting citizens applauded and cheered the victims, the police would emerge and fire their automatics.

Andreas Papandreou is a professor of economics at York University in Toronto and the leader of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK).

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An orchestrated report, time and again, gave as "thirteen" the number of dead. While we may never know the exact number of the dead and wounded, it is certain that at least 400 people lost their lives and that at least 1,000 were wounded. Reliable reports reaching us now indicate the existence of mass graves in two army camp locations in the environs of Athens.

The first signs of the brewing storm came on November 4, during memorial services for George Papandreou, the last elected premier. Approximately 10,000 citizens gathered at the cemetery. As the services ended, the crowd, chanting revolutionary songs, moved forcefully toward Constitution Square. The slogans included "democracy," "death to Papadopoulos," "out with the Americans," and "Thailand, Thailand." The police tried to block the militant crowd, but failed. In the skirmishes that ensued, many police were wounded. It was only after several university students had managed to raise the Greek flag in Constitution Square that the police finally succeeded in breaking up the demonstration. There were demonstrations again a week later outside the courthouse where suspected leaders of the November 4 clashes were on trial. But no one could suspect the massive character and the violence of the events that were to follow, as the students of the Polytechnic Institute decided on November 14 to occupy it. The occupation of the Polytechnic was a carefully designed political act. A press release, given out on November 16 by the Student Coordination Committee, clearly shows that:

> The students . . . have become conscious that our problem in relation to the democratization of education and the operation of the educational system could not be solved without change in the political situation. Thus the students and the working people have taken over the Polytechnic Institute to make our positions clear and to call upon the Greek people to join us and fight with us until final victory.
>
> The main prerequisite for the solution of the problems of the people is the immediate overthrow of the tyrannical regime of the junta and the simultaneous establishment of popular sovereignty.
>
> The establishment of popular sovereignty is intertwined with national independence from foreign interests which for years have been supporting tyranny in our country. The vast mobilization of the Greek people and the demonstrations of solidarity from all

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corners of Greece is the best answer to all those who tried to defame us.

Greek people, the struggle for popular sovereignty and national independence today means the immediate mass trade-union fight . . . strikes, mass mobilizations, mass demonstrations, with target: the general strike for the overthrow of the junta.

Here at the Polytechnic is the center for the mobilization, *en masse,* of the popular struggle. All united in the struggle for democracy and national independence!

The Polytechnic then became the headquarters for the revolution. Workers, professionals, and peasants had joined the students. They elected task-oriented standing committees, which in turn elected a secret coordinating committee. The coordinating committee had a powerful weapon—a radio transmitter that kept calling upon the people of Greece to join the struggle. "This is the radio station of the free fighting students, of the free fighting Greeks. . . . Greek people, today you are engaged in your greatest battle, in your strongest and most noble struggle for the overthrow of the dictatorship, for freedom, for democracy, for national independence, for social change. Today you must stand up and be counted. Today you must struggle with us. Today you must act in solidarity with the youth of the country. . . ."

The people responded *en masse,* streaming toward the Polytechnic to form a protective ring around it, and to offer food, drugs, and money. They then spread rapidly throughout the city to liberate almost three fourths of it. Fires were started in many parts of the city as the night wore on, to neutralize the effect of tear-gas bombs which were the first offensive weapon used by the police.

The radio of the Polytechnic continued with appeals for medicine, for ambulances, for doctors. The confrontation was on. The coordinating committee's slogans resounded throughout the city through the transistor radios being carried by the populace, and through the mouths of the demonstrators: "fascism will not pass," "power to the workers," "the Americans out of Greece," "Greece out of NATO," "sovereignty to the people," "down with the junta." In every part of Athens there was a sense that the critical moment was approaching. Some public buildings were occupied by the people. An attempt was made

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to occupy the Ministry of Public Order and the telecommunications building.

The radio went on: "People of Athens, don't go away! Don't be afraid! Tonight fascism will die!" As midnight approached, barricades were thrown together by groups of citizens who spontaneously formed action committees. Soon after midnight the sporadic gunfire of the day turned into repeated, frequent bursts of shooting, and the tanks began moving across the city toward the Polytechnic. Tear gas, the sirens of ambulances, the fire of automatics, spread confusion and anger but not fear. The radio continued: "United the people are fighting against the junta, the agents of foreign interests. We are unarmed! We are unarmed! We will repel the attack of the occupation forces with our naked breasts. The tanks are moving against us. The tanks of America's agents. . . . We believe that no soldier, no officer who loves his country will dare to kill his brothers, to spill Greek blood. Two tanks are reaching the gates of the Polytechnic. The guns are trained on us. They will not attack. They will not kill the youth of Greece!"

The tanks moved on, and opened the way for the police. It is a fact, however, that the soldiers were reluctant to shoot. No less than ten were executed on the spot for disobedience. But the police more than made up for this. Trained over the years by U.S. specialists, they attacked with speed and ferocity. During this night, martial law was declared.

The decision to reimpose martial law to quell the revolution could not have been an easy one for Papadopoulos and his U.S. sponsors. For it meant the end of his "republic," the democratic façade that had been intended to offer the military regime the respectability requisite for participation in European councils.

While the republic is now dead, a brief review of its main characteristics is essential, for it discloses the Pentagon's and the CIA's concept of what an army-ruled client state ought to be like. Furthermore, it provides the necessary background for understanding the reluctance of the bourgeois political parties in Greece to accept the rules of the game incorporated in Papadopoulos's constitution. This reluctance, to a large extent the reflection of the militant resistance of the people to military

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rule, did contribute to the climate surrounding the mid-November confrontation. The republic which emerged from the Thieu-like referendum of July 29, 1973 (Papadopoulos ran for the office of president unopposed), was not meant to be a variant of bourgeois democracy, for it vested directly all the substantive powers of the state in the president. According to the constitution, the armed forces are recognized as a fourth branch of government, side by side with the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. In particular, the president, who holds office for seven years, is the active head of the armed forces, and is vested with both executive *and* legislative powers in all matters relating to national defense (the military and para-military), public order (police, gendarmerie, national security), intelligence, and foreign policy. Thus the *management of violence* and *foreign policy* are the exclusive prerogative of the president, who therefore could not possibly hold the office without the confidence and the support of the armed forces. The central mechanisms of the state are *formally* insulated from the parliamentary process, which is restricted to secondary issues. In bourgeois democracy these mechanisms are protected from the sway of the parliamentary process in informal, though not always subtle, ways. And the mechanisms of oppression are available to be used, as was so dramatically displayed in Chile, to set aside both parliament and constitution when there is a threat to the interests of the ruling class.

Furthermore, in bourgeois democracy restrictions on the participation of political parties and individual candidates in the parliamentary process take the form of "loading the dice," whether this relates to access to funds, or to access to the mass news media—not taking into account, of course, the more subtle impact of indoctrination of the populace with the value system of the dominant class. Naturally, there are exceptions to this schema in many bourgeois democracies. In many countries, e.g., the participation of the communist parties is forbidden by constitutional provisions. But under Papadopoulos's republic a permanent instrument for *policing* political life is provided by the constitution itself. The president appoints for life a constitutional court which must approve party constitutions, party platforms and individual candidacies. Its judgment is based on the

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"national interest." This court has sweeping powers. For not only can it deny irrevocably the participation of a party or a candidate in elections, but it may—any time it so decides—remove from office a member of parliament or of the cabinet, or indeed all the members of a party, if it determines that this serves the national interest. Thus the armed forces, through the president, retain effective control over the political life of the country.

Actually, Papadopoulos's republic guaranteed only that the armed forces of Greece would dominate the political life of the country. What it could not guarantee *formally* was that these armed forces would act in the interests of a metropolitan center, in the interests of the United States. For in that case Greece would have become, in name as well as in fact, a colony of the United States, something that would contradict the new style of colonialism propagated in the context of contemporary imperialism. This function of the Greek armed forces is guaranteed, however, through substantive processes—such as the training of Greek officers in the United States and other NATO countries, control over appointments to key positions in the military forces, infiltration of CIA agents throughout the Greek intelligence apparatus, the dependence of the Greek armed forces on U.S. matériel, the organic integration of the Greek armed forces into broader defense plans for the Mediterranean, American control of the army's information system, etc.

This constitution, whose intellectual father is Professor Dimitrios Koussoulas of Howard University, was an attempt to formalize, to write into law, certain aspects of the power structure which have been characteristic of Greece ever since the Civil War of the 1940s. It is a fact that while the Center Union party, a broad coalition of populist political forces, took government office by defeating rightist strong-man Karamanlis in the elections of February 1964 (receiving 53 percent of the popular vote), *it could not penetrate the machinery of the state.* To all intents and purposes, the armed forces, the intelligence services, and the security forces were entirely beyond the reach of cabinet ministers. The Center Union's attempt to challenge this reality led to a confrontation with the King—then the spokesman for the Greek establishment—the dismissal of the

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Center Union government, the "unyielding campaign" for new elections, and a deep political crisis that was resolved only with the colonels' coup of April 21, 1967.

To understand the post-Civil War history of Greece, one must bear in mind that the political life of the country was closely supervised, when not directed, by the United States. The Washington formula for Greece was simple. It included the direct penetration of the Greek state machinery, all the way through to the Palace; unconditional support for an affiliated, dependent political party, the party of the Right, which was supposed to win all elections—no matter through what means; the development of a bourgeois opposition party whose task was to engage in creative criticism of the policies of the rightist government, a role that had been reserved for the party of the Center Union; finally, the obliteration of any party of the Left. But things went wrong for the Americans in the 1960s. The Center Union party won a spectacular majority and formed a government. What was worse for the United States, this victory was based on a program that stressed national independence and substantial social reforms—providing a bridge to power for the Greek Left.

From information that is now available, it is clear that the decision for a military coup in Greece was taken in Washington in mid-1965. But the actual execution was delayed until 1967 to forestall the kind of bloodshed that recently occurred in Santiago. In Greece this delay was possible because the machinery of violence, indeed the whole of the Greek state, was under pervasive American control. Time was needed, however, in order to install a succession of puppet governments that would clean up the trade unions, eliminate all possible opponents in the armed services and the security forces, and create the proper climate. The monarchy's prestige was unavoidably used up during the two-year confrontation between the establishment and the popular forces. In any case, since a decision had been made to rely thenceforth on the armed forces, on the state machinery itself for the effective control and government of Greece, the monarchy's role no longer seemed important. This explains the selection of Papadopoulos and his CIA-trained and controlled colleagues for carrying out the coup rather than have the King assume direct power.

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It was expected that after six years of harsh military rule, the Greeks would be ready to accept a constitution that would guarantee parliamentary processes—but no access to power. This was the meaning of Papadopoulos's "republic." To get the political world of Greece to accept this façade, thus giving sanction to the structure of power, Papadopoulos declared an amnesty for political prisoners and initiated other liberalization measures. But the political world of Greece did not take the bait. By the end of September, Papadopoulos and the Americans knew that they were in trouble. There were two immediate reasons for this. First, the clear-cut, black-and-white secondary role reserved by the constitution to parliament and to political parties; second, the immediate and intense use of all the freedoms that were extended by the regime to the press. The press, after long years of being gagged, and in the context of a highly competitive market, served the people what they had been yearning for: an open critique of the regime and a thorough disclosure of the authoritarian character of the "republic." Students, workers, peasants, and professionals started mobilizing in organized confrontations across the land. The regime, concerned that tightening the vise would mar the image of the new republic and condemn the experiment to failure, allowed the situation to accelerate. The final blow came with the popular uprising of mid-November. The regime overreacted, conducted a massacre, and became thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the armed forces and the United States. Papadopoulos had to go. A new guard had to be called in. Throwing Papadopoulos to the wolves—in this case allowing him his freedom at his Onassis villa on the Attica sea coast—would also momentarily placate the anger of the people and hopefully persuade them that something new had happened, that a change had occurred.

The "coup d'état" of November 25th constitutes simply a change of guard. The new junta is merely a portion of the old one, and it took power peacefully under the supervision of the CIA—to demonstrate, as the Greeks put it, that "the Greek army is the most disciplined component of the American military forces." In accordance with the wishes of the CIA, the post of prime minister was given to its trusted instrument, Chicago lawyer Androutsopoulos. (One of Androutsopoulos's main prob-

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lems is that he does not speak the Greek language well.) Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides is the strong man of the new six-man junta. The head of the feared military police (ESA) and a well-known torturer, he is dedicated to serving American policies blindly and is deeply anti-communist. Equally committed to U.S. control of Greece and to direct military rule is general Bonanos, chief of the Greek Armed Forces. General Ghizikis, the new president of the republic, is another of the six. He is relatively unimportant, but represents those senior officers who favor a more indirect presence of the armed forces in the political life of Greece. A somewhat larger, overlapping group or "committee," consisting of twelve officers, designs the grand strategy of the regime—and is, in a sense, the brain-trust of the six-man junta. It includes Colonel Steakakis who is the only junta member committed to a Qaddafi-style national independence and state capitalism.

Actually, two tendencies predominate within the ranks of the new junta. The first is for indefinite, direct, military rule, with the cabinet being relegated to the status of a necessary ornament. The second is for a deal with the politicians of the Right and Center-Right, which would permit the armed forces to play a less visible role in the public life of the country. The politician that seems best suited to this role is Karamanlis. But this does not mean that there exist no alternative choices. Indeed there seem to be quite a few candidates on hand.

One should not exaggerate the importance of these currents or tendencies within the ranks of the new junta, for the United States plays the decisive, determining role. Under this junta, more than ever before, Washington openly controls the public life of Greece. And the present regime represents to the Americans no more than a holding operation. But there seems to be some uncertainty on the part of the policy-makers as to where to go from here. They are no longer in possession of a grand design for Greece—and this in the face of a deepening and irresolvable economic crisis and a citizenry that, following the bloody events of November, has found renewed strength and determination to confront the regime.

This explains the peculiar combination of continuing and expanding repression—arrests, torture, the closing down of news-

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papers—and a complete absence of any visible policy in connection either with the economy or the political evolution of the country.

The political problems confronting the regime are no less severe than the economic. It is clear to the military, as it is clear to the Americans, that naked force will not work in the long run. The eruption of new bloody confrontations will corrode the morale of the armed forces, no matter how tightly the Americans control the Greek military. Thus it would seem highly desirable to those in control to proceed once again toward some sort of democratic façade. Can they succeed where Papadopoulos failed? November's events have conclusively disclosed how explosive Papadopoulos's scheme was—the formal partition of the political process into a component monopolized by the armed forces and a component open to parliamentary competition. The emerging concept is that of a strong police state, backed by the armed forces, and ornamented by a civilian government recruited from among the rightist political world. For the success of this scheme it is not enough to woo a portion of the political world—a process, by the way, already initiated through the announcement of a reduction in the powers of the president over national defense, public order, and foreign policy, and through a promise of further reforms along these lines. It is essential, indeed critical to the success of the scheme, that those in charge gain for it a minimal popular support. Such support, to be meaningful, to make a difference, would have to come from the Greek middle class. This would then permit the regime to introduce the paraphernalia, the external characteristics, of bourgeois parliamentary processes.

The new junta and its American sponsors are forced by the press of circumstances to attempt now what Papadopoulos failed to achieve—to transform the covert foreign occupation of Greece into a genuinely fascist regime. Clearly such fascism cannot be of the metropolitan variety. For this would presuppose a more or less robust Greek bourgeoisie. The Greek bourgeoisie, however, is Greek in name only. Foreign capital is predominant. This is as true for the merchant marine as it is true in finance and in big industry—big, that is, by Greek standards. It is equally true in tourism—recently the leading sector of the Greek econ-

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omy. Even the big import-export merchants, who are a significant and vocal component of the Greek ruling class, are dependent on foreign finance or on Greek financial institutions whose policies, however, are dictated by the Greek state—a satellite client state of the United States that reflects the dominant position of U.S. capital in Greece.

But what are the chances of an evolution to what might be called *peripheral fascism?* The key here lies with the middle class. The economic development of Greece during the last seven years—basically a continuation of Karamanlis's period, has undermined the economic base of the middle class. The Greek economic "miracle" had to be short-lived. It was a reflection of the early phase of the takeover by foreign capital after the country was made "safe and stable" for investment. Economic growth was built on a pattern of disarticulation of the Greek economy, on a pattern of dependent, peripheral capitalist development. Greek agriculture, the technological potential of which is quite substantial, and which provides the means of livelihood for almost one half of the Greek population, was allowed to slow down to an almost zero rate of growth during the era of the colonels. Emigration from the countryside to Athens, to Germany, to Belgium, to Australia, to Canada—which began in the post-Civil War years—continued unabated under Papadopoulos's rule. Tourism and luxury apartment construction took the lead. Export-oriented industrial development of the country centered on superficial, finishing-touch activities. Increasingly the Greek economy's changing structure reflected the growth targets of the large and dominant foreign corporate investors. Suddenly the mirage vanished, for that was what it was, a mirage of economic development, when actually what was being fostered was economic underdevelopment—the fate of all satellites swimming in the orbit of capitalist metropoles. Inflation, in 1973, soared to a rate of 40 percent per annum, while the trade deficit passed the $2 billion mark. And what is more, starting with 1974, Greece must transfer abroad $300 million annually in interest and amortization on external debt contracted during the colonels' era.

The middle class, the Greek petty bourgeoisie, under these circumstances finds itself increasingly sharing the fate of the

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worker and the peasant. It follows that this is hardly the time for the Americans to try a fascist solution in Greece. They are bound to fail in this for reasons well beyond their control.

In a very real sense the United States faces an impasse in Greece. The anti-American feeling runs so high that bourgeois democracy is not an eligible option for them. The Greeks have come to identify their bondage, their economic exploitation, with U.S. policy, and, of course, with NATO. No political party could survive in free elections that did not commit itself to national independence, to a complete rupture with NATO, to ousting the American military from the shores of Greece. Limited democracy, Papadopoulos style, represents an unstable equilibrium solution. Popular action would soon force the hand of the military, and a reversion to naked military rule would be inevitable. But naked military rule, the present state of affairs, is increasingly difficult as a long-run solution. The blood of November has united the Greek masses in a common determination to struggle on with all the means at their disposal. Beyond that, the NATO allies of the United States are quite upset by the recent developments. They face internal political problems over their policies vis-à-vis Greece—especially from the Left, from the trade unions, and of course from the politicized youth. Under U.S. pressure they had decided to rid themselves of this conscience-irritant by acquiescing in the solution provided by the Papadopoulos republic. Indeed, European social democracy had urged the bourgeois political world of Greece to accept the package. But this deal is dead now. Once again Greece is under naked military rule. Norway, Denmark, and Holland have made it clear to the United States that they are not prepared to countenance continued NATO support of the Greek junta. The message to the United States is clear. If it settles on continued naked military rule for Greece, it may have to opt for Greece's withdrawal from NATO—and for strictly bilateral arrangements between itself and Greece. Such a development would completely scuttle Greece's associate membership in the Common Market, and would make Greece a direct economic problem for the United States. To Lon Nol's Cambodia and to Thieu's South Vietnam it would have to add the military junta's Greece. Not impossible, but difficult and, in any case, unde-

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sirable. Yet Greece is strategically terribly important to the Americans. With thirteen major U.S. nuclear, military, air, naval, and intelligence bases, Greece has become the key staging area for American control in the Eastern Mediterranean and for intervention, when needed, in the oil-rich Middle East.

The avant-garde role of the Greek youth in the liberation movement—its commitment, its militancy, and its sacrifices—is quite remarkable, for one must keep in mind that the university students were not much more than fifteen years old when the colonels took power. It is not sufficient, of course, to explain the phenomenon by pointing to the obvious fact that university youth has played an important role in all the radical movements of our era. One could almost argue that the "social memory" of the Civil War, of that historic struggle of the Greek people for independence and socialism—which was undermined by a dependent and dogmatic leadership and crushed by British and American imperialism—lingers on. But surely there is more than this. The student movement has found a deep and strong response among the working people of Greece. Without this response the November uprising would have remained just a student demonstration.

The students have articulated effectively the nature of the Greek problem and the character of the struggle ahead. Their positions are consistent with those of a broad spectrum of resistance groups that are increasingly coordinating their actions around two simple central themes—national independence and socialism. This—and their courage—explains the mass support they received in November. Naturally, the uprising was not entirely spontaneous, nor was it unconnected with resistance organizations. But the ratio of organized to spontaneous participants on November 16 was one to five hundred. This shows at once both the strength and the weakness of the movement. And it defines the nature of the task that lies ahead.

But back to the basic unifying themes of the struggle—national independence and socialism. It has become clear in Greece by now that democracy is meaningless in the context of foreign domination, of covert foreign occupation, that popular sovereignty cannot be established without national independence.

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For this reason the primary objective is national liberation—the ousting of the United States and NATO from Greece. But in this struggle, the dependent and comprador Greek bourgeoisie cannot be an ally of the workers, the peasants, the students, the professionals; and now not even of the Greek petty bourgeoisie, for the bourgeoisie is the domestic instrument of foreign domination. This imparts to the struggle its second characteristic. It turns it into a struggle against the capitalist structure of Greek society, into a struggle of the working people of Greece against imperialism, against American metropolitan and Greek peripheral capitalism.

There is unity among the freedom fighters in Greece. It is the unity which is being forged in the context of a genuinely socialist, anti-imperialist liberation movement. This unity was consolidated in the bloody confrontation of November. It constitutes the solid foundation on which the national liberation movement of the Greek people is being built.

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1973: THE YEAR OF EUROPE

BY RICHARD B. Du BOFF

1973, Richard Nixon and his man Kissinger told us a year ago, was slated to be "The Year of Europe." "No aspect of U.S. foreign policy commands greater attention and care than our relations with Western Europe," the President said last spring. Having "ended" the Vietnam war, the United States could now address itself to mending frayed relations with its European allies. President Kennedy's July 4, 1962, "Declaration of Interdependence" with Common Market nations would finally bear fruit. The "Atlantic Community" would emerge from the recesses of nationalism into the sunny uplands of economic cooperation and political harmony.

1973 did turn out to be the Year of Europe, though not as originally promised. Liquidation of large-scale U.S. military activities in Indochina increased the Nixon administration's diplomatic options, but the weight of American initiatives was thrown into the effort to reconstitute U.S. international economic power. Since the major beneficiaries of declining American competitiveness in world trade and the fall of the dollar as key international reserve currency were the Western Europeans (and the Japanese), America's allies were the ones to catch the full

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blast of Nixon's redirected energies in 1973. The Soviet Union and China—themselves badly split—balanced off each other, and both were drawn into Kissinger's *détente* net by the bait of sorely needed American technology and farm produce, large purchases of which not so incidentally helped Washington reduce its balance-of-payments deficits. U.S. exports to China jumped from $5 million in 1971 to $840 million in 1973 (three fourths of it in agricultural products like corn, wheat, cotton, and soybeans), while the United States for the first time moved within range of displacing West Germany as the Soviet Union's largest trading partner with $1.5 billion of two-way trade in 1973 (against $218 million in 1971). During 1973 American exports to the USSR exceeded $1.2 billion, triple the 1972 figure.

On the heels of America's drive to reassert its overseas commercial and financial strength came the world-wide squeeze on supplies of commodities of all kinds—petroleum, plywood, soybeans, wheat, feedgrains and cereals, cocoa, sugar, beef, wool, zinc, copper, rubber—and the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, events which drove deeper economic and political wedges between the United States and Western Europe. The upshot was that 1973 marked a crossroads for the Atlantic partnership forged by 25 years of Cold War and counter-revolution. "The basic question is simple," an American official in Brussels told Robert Keatley of the *Wall Street Journal* (December 10, 1973): "How much longer is there going to be an alliance?"

The Fading Superstar Hangs On

Washington's evolving policy toward Western Europe (as well as toward Japan, to some degree) can be understood in terms of five goals.

(1) The United States is desirous of reviving and overhauling the existing international market and financial system—to retain its own "leadership" prerogatives so far as possible.

The first half of 1973 was featured by a flurry of position papers, declarations, and conferences designed to create an impression of dialogue and negotiation. The most ballyhooed of them, however, gave the game away. On April 23, Kissinger proposed a "new Atlantic Charter": "a revitalized Atlantic part-

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nership . . . a clear set of common objectives [for] setting the goals of the future." But the "unifying framework" would have to take into account the fact that "the United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests." The two, added Kissinger, are not "automatically identical." Thus, "the United States . . . must act as part of and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system." Easing of economic frictions and reconstruction of the international monetary system, as well as maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe, all depend upon European acknowledgment of the "special role" of the United States—as ultimate arbiter and guarantor of the world capitalist system. As if the point needed stressing, Kissinger noted further that "for us European unity is what it has always been—not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West." In other words, autonomy within the "Atlantic ensemble" must be subordinated to its cohesion, as defined and organized by Washington.

On September 20 the European Economic Community (EEC) responded via a draft "Declaration of Principles Between the USA and the European Community," dealing with ten areas of "mutual concern" (among them trade, monetary reform, military security, inflation, environment). It emphasized that the EEC would function "in world affairs as a distinct entity" and would cooperate with the United States "on an equal basis." This autonomous tone rubbed Washington the wrong way. A week later Kissinger and company were condemning the EEC draft as "very thin" and proceeding to rewrite it by throwing in paragraphs of language that should be read in their entirety to be believed: Europe was chided for overlooking causes like furtherance of "common values and aspirations based on a shared heritage"; promotion of "more stable international relationships [and] an open and balanced world economic order"; and "pursuit of common interests for the benefit of all mankind" (*New York Times* text, November 9, 1973). Obviously, such high-minded and disinterested aims can be achieved only by people with true *global* perspectives, not by narrow regionalistic operators.

But this brand of self-serving moralizing (for which Anglo-American politicians are famous) is running up against diminishing returns as its underlying economic and political muscle

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carries less clout than ten or fifteen years ago. Meeting in Copenhagen on December 14, the nine EEC members issued a policy statement on "European identity," citing their "clear ties" with the United States but insisting upon their own independence. The document showed that the nine are moving in an opposite direction from the "special relation" proposed by Kissinger on several occasions in 1973, for it strongly reflected French views on the need for a self-determined "European identity": "International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world."

(2) A closely related aspect of the U.S. program to rebuild *Pax Americana* is the attempt to defuse the "energy crisis" by inducing Europe to align its own petroleum policy with that of the United States. Rivalry among industrial powers for vital oil imports might flare out of control, a fear uppermost in the minds of the 300 men from twelve countries, assembled in Amsterdam on March 26-28, 1973, at a Europe-America Conference on "new roles and relationships in the next decade."* New York oil consultant Walter J. Levy appealed for investing-class solidarity in the face of what he described as blackmail by "the cartel of oil-producing nations" in the Middle East. He then called upon the United States to assume command in formulating a coordinated Western petroleum policy toward "the oil exporters" who, he observed, "don't want to depend on the Soviet Union. Many of the dynasties would not survive." Kissinger took up the same theme in another of his Atlanticist orations in London on December 12, suggesting a joint approach to the world energy problem so that the crisis may "become the economic equivalent of the Sputnik challenge of 1957." He could not resist reminding the Europeans that their own political unity, supported by Washington "in principle," tends "to high-

* The roster included Nelson Rockefeller, George Ball, Eugene V. Rostow, Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Packard, Henry Fowler, Jean Rey, Joseph Luns, Walter Hallstein, Roy Jenkins, and other Western luminaries. Former Under Secretary of State Ball, now a New York investment banker (as is former Treasury Secretary Fowler) found enough time to blast the EEC as "parochial and isolationist."

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light division rather than unity with us." After all, the EEC is far more dependent on Arab oil than the United States. As President Nixon pointedly remarked in his November 17 press conference, the Europeans "would freeze to death" without it.

(3) Nixon's international economic policy rests on a vigorous export drive, a crusade to re-establish trade surpluses large enough to pay for military spending abroad and foreign investment by U.S. corporations.* The March 22, 1973, report of the President's Council on International Economic Policy, headed by Peter Flanigan, accused the EEC and Japan of having an export "surplus syndrome" that discriminated against U.S. goods and damaged our balance of payments. It hinted at tariff reprisals "in response to unfair competition . . . or the closing of markets abroad to our goods." The Flanigan report acknowledged that the biggest deficit item in the U.S. balance of payments is $7 billion for overseas military expenditure and foreign aid, but it regarded this as a burden, long suffered with good grace, which others should share via trade concessions. Yet the report elsewhere observed that withdrawal from these international commitments "would, in fact, be costly to our national economy" and that "there are close ties between our political and military relationships and our economic dealings abroad."

On March 28, 1973, Herbert Stein, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, underscored the necessity for removing foreign barriers to the expansion of U.S. exports. "We have an obligation to behave in a way that permits us to earn [a trade surplus]," Stein declared, "and others have an interest in permitting us to do so." In Nixon's May 3 "State of the World" message to Congress, Europe was invited to help devise new economic arrangements "more equitable for the United States" and was bluntly informed that its otherwise welcome goal of closer economic integration cannot be at the expense of American exports (especially farm produce). In late June Flanigan demonstrated the administration's single-mindedness of purpose in boosting U.S. exports. There are several ways of trimming the

* On this, see my own "Dollar Devaluation and Foreign Trade," MONTHLY REVIEW (March 1972) and "The Devalued Dollar," *Commonweal* (March 30, 1973).

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American balance of payments deficit, Flanigan conceded, "but we believe the cure is in the trade field."

Help in the trade field was on the way. Throughout the spring and summer of 1973 the United States was practicing flagrant monetary dumping. Not only was the dollar devalued for the second time in 14 months on February 12; Washington made it clear that it was not going to lift a finger to support the dollar at any given exchange-rate levels after February 12. As early as March, European officials began to claim that Washington was tolerating, if not covertly encouraging, continuing depreciation of the dollar to gain an even greater trade advantage for U.S. products in world markets. "Dollars have become like bombs from B-52s in Europe," complained one EEC official as the again devalued dollar plunged further still against European currencies and there was no effort whatever on the part of the Federal Reserve to intervene to stop the slide by buying dollars. Indeed, Treasury Secretary George Shultz announced that the already porous restrictions on American capital flowing overseas would now be relaxed another notch. European central and private bankers grew edgier as the flood of depreciating dollars going into their coffers passed the $80 billion total. And the dollar kept sinking until August, when it had fallen an additional 15 to 25 percent against EEC currencies.

Washington utilized other trade-surplus-promoting measures, too, its 1972-1973 innovations including a campaign of harassment against imports (with a record number of findings of "dumping" of foreign goods in the U.S. market—sales "at less than fair market value"—that allow the Treasury Department to impose "antidumping duties") and a push for lowering restrictions on exports to Communist countries. The United States used to be the chief advocate of banning sales of "strategic items" to Communists; in the early 1960s, to cite one of several such cases, it argued with Bonn about West German companies' contracts to sell steel pipeline to the Soviet Union and had the sales barred in December 1962. But times, and U.S. requirements, have changed. "Now, when the coordinating committee for the Western Allies' Trade Embargo Committee meets . . .

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the United States is the major seeker for clearance of new types of products it can sell to the East," reports Flora Lewis (*International Herald Tribune,* July 16, 1973).

The impact of all these trade moves was spectacular. Through the first nine months of 1973, U.S. exports ran 38 percent ahead of 1972, while imports climbed 21 percent. In the third quarter of 1973 the United States piled up a trade surplus of $714 million, a swing of $2.3 billion from third quarter 1972. As a result, the United States enjoyed a full-year trade margin of $1 billion, compared to a $6.3 billion deficit in 1972. And the overall balance of payments, $9.8 billion in the red in 1972, showed a $2.5 billion surplus for third quarter 1973 (the first such overall quarterly surplus since 1969) and wound up over $1 billion in surplus for 1973 as a whole—"an achievement not even approached in previous years, other than 1961 and 1964," according to economic analysts at the Morgan Guaranty Bank.

Everything has its price, however, and the costs of this impressive reversal in U.S. trade fortunes are being extracted from the pocket of the American consumer. From the last quarter of 1972 through the third quarter of 1973 alone, average monthly agricultural exports shot up from $699 million to $1,181 million—69 percent. (By contrast, manufactured goods exports increased 19 percent to a monthly average of $3.6 billion, total exports 25 percent to $5.6 billion.) In the first nine months of 1973 agricultural sales abroad accounted for 39 percent of the total export gain of $14.5 billion. This wholly unprecedented surge in farm exports drained domestic supplies of wheat, corn, and soybeans and tacked on an extra $2 billion to household food bills in 1973, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has estimated. Thus, at least 15 percent of the year's increase in retail food prices can be attributed to the soaring quantities of U.S. agricultural products ordered by foreign buyers.

(4) Washington's export *Putsch* in turn is part of a broader strategy to render the EEC unworkable and divide it against itself—an old colonialist tactic Europeans would savor were they not its victims. Successive dollar devaluations, and additional dollar depreciation, have played havoc with EEC plans for monetary unification: the financial chaos prevailing since the fall of 1971 led to currency floats (by Britain in June 1972

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and Italy in January 1973) and to revaluation of the Dutch guilder in September 1973. For the time being, these dislocations kill any hopes for establishing a common monetary unit for the EEC. Besides, they leave in wreckage the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which is based on fixed internal prices for farm commodities. CAP and monetary union cannot work when currency rates fluctuate, and both (especially CAP) have long been on Washington's prime target list. The EEC's high, uniform, and protected agricultural pricing system is considered to be the single greatest obstacle to increasing American farm exports. Anything that disrupts CAP or monetary union enhances U.S. economic power internationally. In attacking Europe's agricultural sector, Washington is surely aware that it is striking at one of the EEC's weak links and aggravating tension inside the Community. CAP has been painstakingly stitched together through 12 years of delicate negotiations that broke down on three occasions and almost fatally splintered the EEC (most recently last May).

The question of U.S. troop strength in Western Europe—some 310,000 at present, over two thirds in West Germany—deserves much more attention than space here permits. Nonetheless it should be pointed out that just as U.S. dollar devaluations and trade offensives since late 1971 have dealt body blows to EEC-wide monetary and agricultural policies, so does the U.S. military presence in Europe effectively inhibit European military unification. As *Le Figaro's* Raymond Aron put it at the March 1973 Amsterdam Conference, "U.S. defense of Europe psychologically weakens and discourages the Europeans from taking charge of their own defense." To assume Washington is unaware of this or displeased by it represents wishful thinking or rank naiveté. The American leadership must also recognize that it holds the trump card: European ruling classes are not anxious to see U.S. troops depart, not because GIs furnish any real military shield against an extremely unlikely Soviet assault westward, but because they provide an essential psychological crutch against the emergence of socialist, communist, or "third force" sentiment in the EEC, and exhibit Washington's commitment to maintain capitalist social structures in Western Europe. Even French Defense Minister Michel Jobert, one of the staunchest spokesmen for the Gaullist concept of European

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"independence" from the United States, told the French National Assembly on November 12 that "whatever our efforts [for 'untiringly pursuing' political autonomy for the EEC] it is clear . . . that for the time being our security and that of Europe are linked to the presence of U.S. troops in Europe." This, in the very same speech in which Jobert castigated the United States and the Soviet Union for setting up a "veritable condominium" during the Middle East fighting and treating Europe "like a nonperson, humiliated all along the line." Nine days later Jobert repeated this act, calling for a concerted EEC defense effort independent of the United States, denouncing "exclusive superpower crisis management," but terming NATO—which France quit in 1966—"indispensable to the security of the United States as it is to Europe."

Such a contradictory stance reveals that something else is worrying the EEC establishment. From EEC headquarters in Brussels Richard Janssen filed this *Wall Street Journal* report (November 28, 1973):

> The tolerance of unemployment in Western Europe is apt to prove far less than in the U.S. "There would be violence, and anything could happen," including "Chilean-type situations," predicts a pessimistic continental. If losing elections to leftists and undergoing bloody right-wing coups sounds too grotesquely grim, one need only look at the precariousness of cabinets (or even lack of them) in Denmark, Holland and Turkey, the difficulty of forming coalitions in Italy and Belgium, electoral uncertainties in England and Germany, or Greece's tank-backed regime. A convulsed and weakened Western Europe would be ripe for a high degree of "Finlandization," it's widely feared here. . . . [This] might mean that a nation must be studiously and nervously neutral, keeping out of such institutions as NATO and the EEC, and putting top foreign policy priority on avoiding offense to the Russians.
>
> A less severe repercussion from a European economic crisis would be "Swedenization." . . . This, too, would take West Europe's industrial nations out of any clear-cut alliance with the U.S. against the Communists. "That would be something of a disappointment to the U.S.," says one emissary. . . .*

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* In Bonn and Paris, Seymour Topping also heard fears expressed over "Finlandization" and "Soviet influence" should large numbers of U.S. troops be pulled out of Europe (*New York Times,* December 2, 1973). See also Max Frankel's December 21, 1971, *New York Times* survey of

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That such fears are shared by American ruling circles needs little elaboration. It is significant, for example, that the *New York Times,* normally a paragon of sober wording in its editorials, employs harsh language against—of all people—Senator Mike Mansfield whenever he offers his annual "Mansfield Amendment" for unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Western Europe. For such proposals Senator Mansfield earns labels like "foolish" and "reckless" and sees himself painted as the author of "The Mansfield Fallacy," which would be "a mistake of historic proportions." "In Europe, vital American interests are involved," warns the *Times.* To ignore that would be to "cater to neo-isolationist emotions."*

(5) The binding agent in American policies toward the EEC is *détente*: enlisting the Soviet Union in Kissinger's "structure of peace." "The economies of our two countries are complementary," American officials have been letting on to Washington and Moscow-based journalists (the contrast with Europe and Japan presumably being self-evident). *Détente* serves the economic interests of both nations, in ways indicated earlier. In fact, the economic-political deal the Soviet Union has always wanted is with the United States, not Europe. One of the elements of that deal is consolidation of the status quo in Europe, something which also dovetails with long-term American strategy. The Soviet Union, by agreeing to enter into the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna two years ago, shows that it understands the implications of a unilateral U.S. troop cutback in Europe, namely, that it would lead to new pressures and policies in Western Europe. This is something Moscow prefers to forestall.

In sum, like Washington, Moscow fears an independent EEC because it might shake up a European political status quo that satisfies both capitals: it fits Washington's conception of "the Western world," Moscow's of "the socialist camp." One

* See the *New York Times* editorials of January 26, 1970; May 16, 1971; and September 29, 1973.

sentiment in France, Germany, and Britain against U.S. troop cuts in Europe. On December 9, 1973, the *Times* summarized "the original American reasons for stationing troops in Europe [after 1945]: to help provide a defensive bulwark for Western nations . . . and to provide 'stability' in those Western countries."

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need only recall the Soviets' non-reaction to Kissinger's "new Atlantic Charter" speech and the other Nixon administration initiatives toward Europe in 1973. Imagine how the Kremlin would have reacted to them back in the Dulles era!

The Crumbling of Liberal Keynesianism

The spreading disarray in the Atlantic community—clashes over the Middle East and the distribution of petroleum supplies—is not so much a matter of immediate crisis as an outgrowth of fundamental contradictions in postwar Keynesian political economy. As Europe has grown wealthier, it has naturally become more self-centered and independent. Moreover, its own "economic growth" is generating the same kinds of social antagonisms evident in the United States (and Canada) since the 1950s—escalating disruption of the natural environment and automobile-induced urban degradation; a louder clamor, and more fervent expectations, on the part of underprivileged classes for their due share of the Affluent Society's "goods"; and perhaps most noteworthy, more intractable problems of inflation and underemployment (a worsening trade-off between general price increases and reduced joblessness); and an irresolvable conflict between incomes policies ("wage-price guidelines" in the United States) and the distribution of income.*

These perverse results of the "high-mass-consumption" growth deliberately pursued by Western governments over the past two decades give rise to *national* dilemmas. Keynesian stabilization theory—the conscious stimulating of spending to achieve full employment and social tranquility within the framework of free-enterprise captalism—has *reduced* the margin that political leaders have for maneuver. This is exactly the opposite of what liberals have been saying about it for the past 30 years. The very existence of Keynesian concepts means that the socially acceptable level of unemployment in capitalist societies is much

* "The fatal flaw in the practice of the New Economics stems from a fundamental error in the theory on which it is based . . . that there is an ideal target—full employment without inflation—that can be achieved simply by a proper adjustment in the government's aggregate expenditures and taxes . . . [T]he assumption finds no support in experience. At no point in history, even temporarily, was the target achieved in any country where the New Economics was practiced." Melville J. Ulmer, *The Welfare State: U.S.A.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 33.

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lower than it used to be, and citizens have been conditioned to expect a decent showing from their government in keeping joblessness within bounds. Likewise, thanks to modern-day "economic growth" ideology, anticipated standards of personal consumption keep rising. But while capitalist governments are obliged to perform well in the employment and income fields, the tools at their disposal are limited—and growing more so. Private investment can be stimulated by tax cuts, investment credits, and accelerated depreciation allowances, but at bottom the decisions here rest in private hands, not in those of the policy-makers. Government expenditures can also be stepped up or down to counterbalance the business cycle, but there are obvious political restraints of flexibility in fiscal policy. Government spending is actually diminishing in reliability as a countercyclical weapon, according to EEC economist Michel Albert, who has found that as inflation becomes chronic in free-market economies, even tighter clamps are placed on public budgets as politicians look for the easiest methods to combat inflation.* Finally, foreign sales may be encouraged as a means for increasing national income and employment, but excessive zeal in pushing one's own exports opens up, as we have seen, a Pandora's Box of potential troubles, from retaliation by foreigners to creation of commodity shortages at home.

The foregoing implies, I believe, that Western governments now enjoy substantially less room for free-wheeling action in the international arena than at any time during the postwar period. "Grand designs abroad" might impinge upon "national priorities," and unforeseen, uncontrollable events in distant lands (like "irrational" resistance by black-pajamaed guerrillas in Asian jungles) could well impose breaking-point strains on already precarious government finances, raw material stocks, or wage-price equilibrations and profit margins. Thus, policy-makers *must* become more "inward-looking"—an old U.S. accusation against the EEC that Europeans have begun to hurl back at the United States. International "commitments" must now take a back seat to domestic concerns, except when one directly serves the other (assuring an uninterrupted flow of raw material im-

* *La croissance du coût des infrastructures et des équipements collectifs.* Rapport no. 7, par M. Albert (Venise: Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1972).

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ports, for instance). Paradoxically, it is the expanding international economy—the increasingly dense network of global input-output flows—that is heightening rather than alleviating the internal contradictions of capitalist nations in the 1970s and forcing elected officials to turn their attention inward.

The internationalization of the capitalist economic system —the growing interdependence of all national economies geared to unrestrained, consumeristic "growth"—is weaving such extraordinarily complex interrelationships among basic resource availabilities, agricultural commodity supplies, wholesale prices, money markets, and corporate investment decisions that it is becoming impossible for the rational businessman to determine the consequences of his actions or even the parameters within which he will have to make critical choices. Open-ended "economic growth," based on privatized accumulation of consumer durables as the road to the better life, spawns waves of new demands, and this, along with military spending, has emerged as the great Keynesian offset to the inherent tendency of the system toward stagnation and unemployment. But its world-wide spread, even to elites in many Third-World countries, sends producers scrambling for resources and markets all over the earth. Consequently industrial nations appear more prone, as *Fortune* sees it (September 1973, p. 161), to having

> inflationary problems of about the same degree. Nations are less and less able to insulate themselves from inflationary currents elsewhere in the world. This quite unprecedented situation has some implications of which many businessmen still seem to be only dimly aware. The principal reason . . . is that businessmen all through the industrial world try to solve their supply problems by buying up other nations' resources; thus a slackening of the inflation rate in any particular nation will soon be followed by a heavy demand for the output of that nation, which, of course, raises its inflation rate all over again.

Naturally, major corporations attempt to shift these cost increases, along with higher wages, forward to retail prices. The sequence is particularly inflationary in heavily monopolized international markets (photographic equipment, drugs, computers, tires) where what Veblen called "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency"—artificial scarcity—can be practiced. Here monopoly rents, barriers to entry by new firms, and intense product dif-

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ferentiation destroy any connection between prices and productivity.

Western governments as presently constituted—compelled to help private industry "deliver the goods"—have little choice other than to facilitate this "gale of creative destruction." But by so doing they fuel the fires of inflation, economic dualism, and vicious social inequity (not to mention the other negative by-products of "economic growth"). At the same time they must struggle (vainly) to restore some semblance of social and economic equilibrium. Even in nations like the United States and West Germany with small and poorly organized left movements, the threat of rampaging inflation and festering crises in housing, urban amenities, public goods, and unemployment (which constantly seems on the verge of lurching upward despite all the "growth") are prospects that no intelligent member of the power structure can contemplate with equanimity. The search is on for ways to keep the lid on social unrest at least cost.

This new set of forces has been developing, along with corporate multinationalism, since the mid-1950s, but a turning point arrived in August 1971 when Nixon's "new economic policy" and the devaluation of the dollar signaled the end of American hegemony. Hegemonic power has always been imperative for the smooth and stable functioning of the capitalist system—witness the flowering of international capitalism under Britain's aegis from 1850 to 1914 and "the world the dollar built" from 1945 to 1970. Conversely, how to put together a solid, orderly alliance without a hegemonic function? Capitalism appears to work "best" under the influence of authoritative, coercive power; and when that power breaks down, mutually injurious conflict usually ensues. True to form, Nixon's aggressive acts of August 15, 1971, and thereafter have ushered in a period of uncertainty, discord, future shock. They denote the end of a long stretch of relative capitalist stability and send out, once again, that familiar clarion call, *sauve qui peut*—every man for himself.

That, in essence, is the message Nixon and Kissinger conveyed to their allies to celebrate the Year of Europe. And so far America does have the upper hand. Not only is American power still formidable, but there are also forces making for disunity

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inside the EEC: the uneven effects of CAP, especially on high-cost German and Italian farm sectors, along with spiraling food prices in Britain since it joined the EEC; and the bogging down of "regional development" plans for depressed areas like the Italian *Mezzogiorno* and Limburg province in Holland. Above all, the energy picture is grim. Britain should have abundant North Sea petroleum by 1980 but may prefer to monopolize it. The French resisted oil sharing with Holland during the Arab boycott, and the Dutch let it be known that they might hold back on natural gas exports (they had earlier rejected cooperating in French nuclear power projects). But EEC countries did refuse permission for the United States to use its European military facilities to help rearm Israel during the October 1973 war. They openly derided U.S. explanations for the October 25 world-wide "alert" of its military forces, drawing an expression of "disgust" from Kissinger. The EEC has shown, too, that it can make things rough for Washington in the trade, monetary, and investment spheres. And it could follow the Italian lead in by-passing U.S. oil companies by setting up its own independent purchasers and refiners to deal directly with the producer countries. A Year of America is not an impossibility.

MONTHLY REVIEW
(Selecciones en Castellano)
Apartado Nal. 8004
Bogotá, Colombia

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VICISSITUDES OF THE AESTHETIC IDEAS OF MARX

BY ADOLFO SANCHEZ VAZQUEZ

> Man therefore also forms things in accordance with the laws of beauty.
>
> Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*

> An *objet d'art* creates a public that has artistic taste and is able to enjoy beauty—and the same can be said of any other product.
>
> Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*

Marx never wrote a treatise on aesthetics; nor did he deal extensively with any specific aesthetic problems. Nevertheless, as the various anthologies of his comments on art and literature show, he always took a keen interest in questions of aesthetics in general, and of art and literature in particular.[1]* In his philosophical and economic works, such as *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Critique of Political Economy, Capital, Theories of Surplus Value,* etc., we find ideas which have a direct bearing on such fundamental aesthetic and artistic prob-

The above selection is Chapter 1 of *Art and Society: Essays in Marxist Aesthetics,* by Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, recently published by Monthly Review Press. The author is professor of aesthetics and contemporary philosophy at the University of Mexico and author of several works on aesthetics. The translator is Maro Riofrancos.

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

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lems as: art and work, the nature of aesthetics, the social and creative aspects of art, the social nature of the aesthetic experience, art as part of the ideological superstructure, the class origin and relative autonomy of a work of art, the uneven development of art and society, the relationship between art and reality, ideology and cognition, artistic creation and material production under capitalism, the durability of a work of art, etc. We also find in Marx's writings numerous critical evaluations of various writers. These comments, because of their theoretical content, are of great value in deepening our understanding of Marx's aesthetic and artistic views. Marx's ideas on aesthetics can be found scattered throughout his work, and some—perhaps the most important—appear in his earlier works; those in his later works are found in the context of an examination of fundamental Marxist questions. The aesthetic thought of Marx does not constitute, therefore, an organic doctrine, a fully developed aesthetic, but this does not diminish in any way its importance as an essential aspect of his views on man and society.

Marxism, Humanism, and Art

Marx could not ignore aesthetic and artistic issues—his world outlook constantly brought him face to face with them. In the light of these issues we can perceive Marx's conception of the *total* man, his alienation conquered and his essential powers fully at his disposal. Certainly, artistic creation and aesthetic gratification presupposed, in Marx's eyes, the specifically human appropriation of things and of human nature that is to prevail in a communist society, a society that will mark humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into that of freedom.

A true appreciation of Marx's aesthetic ideas cannot be separated from the human and artistic praxis which corroborate them. But at the same time, if they are to stand out in all their intensity they cannot be made marginal to the vicissitudes of Marxist thought. It is no coincidence that those interpreters of Marx's thought who have proven least capable of sensing his vitality have also been blind to his aesthetic ideas. The question of the value and range of these ideas, as well as of the possibility of constructing an aesthetic using them as *starting* points (rather than as a fully developed system), requires an under-

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standing of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis; more precisely of a praxis which aims to transform human reality radically (on a concrete historical level, to transform capitalist society) so as to establish a society in which humanity can give free rein to its essential powers, frustrated, denied, postponed, and emasculated for so long. This understanding of Marxism as the true humanism, as the radical transformation of humanity on all planes, fulfills Marx's aspiration, already formulated in his youthful works, that "man's Supreme Being should be man himself." Aesthetics cannot be alien to this humanist Marxism, since, as we shall see in the course of this book, it is an essential dimension of human existence. Because of this, Marx necessarily had to deal with aesthetic problems, perhaps too briefly and not well enough articulated, but with a depth informed by his conception of humanity and by his thesis of the revolutionary transformation of society.

Kautsky's Marxism "Without Aesthetics"

The problem of extracting the germinal value of Marx's compact and suggestive aesthetic formulations thus can be approached only in the context of his world outlook, and on the basis of an understanding of Marxism as the true humanism of our times. It is not possible to appreciate the full value of Marx's aesthetic ideas, and grasp the potential for a Marxist aesthetic, when his entire doctrine is reduced to mere economics and politics, interpreted from a reformist point of view that ignores its philosophical essence. But such was the theoretical position of German Social Democrats at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Karl Kautsky, for example, saw in Marxism only a specific conception of society, not a philosophy. Having been emaciated until nothing remained but the bones of a simplistic economic and philosophical theory, Marxism had to be fleshed out with a borrowed philosophy, called in to explain the existence of the realm of human values, to which art belongs. In this way, aesthetic problems were left out in the cold, exiled from the Marxist discourse, their analysis put in the hands of an idealist philosophy—usually of Kantian derivation—used to fill the gaps left by historical materialism. The official theoreticians of Social Democracy—Kautsky and

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Eduard Bernstein among others—thought that the only contribution Marxism could make to the field of aesthetics was in an explanation of the influence of economic factors on art. But with this quirk: the central thesis of historical materialism on the determining role of economic relations was, in the final analysis, interpreted by these theoreticians in such a schematic and one-dimensional way that its real significance was entirely lost.

Marx's aesthetic ideas, and consequently a Marxist aesthetic, could gain no inspiration from this tendency to emasculate the humanist and revolutionary content of Marxism and to vulgarize the fundamental thesis of historical materialism regarding the relationship between the base and the superstructure, which includes artistic activity. Thus we can see why the aesthetic ideas of Marx were ignored and his literary criticism was taken to be purely personal taste without any general theoretical significance.

Contributions and Limitations of the First Marxist Art Theoreticians

The situation changed in the last decades of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when several Marxist art theoreticians attempted, for the first time, to recover the vitality of Marxism, although their endeavors were not free of error and one-sidedness. In the process of reestablishing Marx's legacy, they began to get a glimpse of the importance and fruitfulness of his aesthetic ideas. Among those who dealt most brilliantly and innovatively with aesthetic questions were Paul Lafargue in France, Franz Mehring in Germany, and G. V. Plekhanov in Russia.

Lafargue was interested in highlighting the relationship between art and social and class interests; but in underlining the ideological character of a work of art he lost sight of its specific mode of reflecting reality. Nevertheless, although he showed a certain class subjectivism, Lafargue, like Marx, recognized art as a social phenomenon.

Mehring likewise stressed the class character of art and denounced the pretensions of pure art, aloof from social concerns; yet he sustained a fondness for certain Kantian theses which he considered essential complements to Marxism. On the

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one hand, he conceived of art as a social phenomenon and a part of the superstructure; in that sense he saw that it is conditioned by class interests and incapable of reaching a totally universal plane. On the other hand, he attempted to free art from that conditioning with the help of Kantian formalist aesthetics. His study of a work of art thus placed him at the fork of two roads, an analysis of content and an analysis of form, causing him to waver between a sociological schematism and a Kantian formalism.

Plekhanov attempted to overcome this contradiction between social determinism and the autonomy of art. In a series of concrete studies he underscored the intimate relationship between art and class struggle; at the same time, he showed the relativism of the concept of beauty and pointed out the unity of content and form as well as the determining role of ideological content. However, he did not always clearly establish the social nature of art and of the aesthetic sense: he acknowledged the existence of psychological laws in the historical development of society and art, and fell into a kind of biological determinism in speaking of the sense of beauty. There is no doubt that Plekhanov made substantial contributions to the Marxist theory of the social conditioning of art and to the exegesis of the historical succession of aesthetic ideals and artistic tastes; but he failed to resolve the problem of the relative autonomy of the creative work. Although he recognized the necessity for analyzing the artistic merits of a work of art, as well as of situating it in the social dimension, he did not succeed in linking one with the other. Consequently, his work took him on a search for what he termed the sociological equivalent of a given literary phenomenon.

It is no accident that Plekhanov's work gave rise to a tendency that reduced Marxist aesthetics to a sociology of art and overlooked the question of relative autonomy which Engels had already begun to emphasize, especially in his letters during the 1890s. Marx himself laid the foundations for the concept of autonomy when he evolved his law of the uneven development of art and society, and when he called attention to the durability of Greek art despite, or as a result of, its social and ideological conditioning.

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Lenin and Art

Lenin claims a prominent place in the movement to recover and enrich the philosophical heritage of Marx and Engels, the heritage that the Second International either corrupted or ignored.

In an article written in 1905, "Party Organization and Party Literature," Lenin touched on questions of great importance to a Marxist aesthetic: the relations among art, ideology, and society; the party spirit of a work of art, etc. Starting with Engels's thesis that a tendentious spirit is intrinsic to the nature of art, Lenin put particular emphasis on the class character and social and ideological roles of art and literature. When, with the emergence of Marxism, the social and ideological perspective of the process of transforming society becomes clear, the artist who desires to link his creative work to the revolutionary cause consciously adopts that perspective and fuses his creative work with the revolutionary struggle. In this sense, literature has a party character. Behind the absolute freedom of creative work constantly paraded by bourgeois thinkers is hidden the most wretched dependency; only in the solidarity between his creative efforts and those social forces which are struggling for an authentic human and social liberation can the artist hope to assure his own liberty. This is the core of Lenin's "Party Organization and Party Literature."

Nowhere is there the slightest indication that Lenin felt the need to regiment artistic work or outline the permissible range of themes, styles, forms, etc. On the contrary, he understood that "literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or levelling, to the rule of the majority over the minority. There is no question, either, that in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content."[2] Indeed, as is shown by the cultural and artistic policies of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party during its first years in power, Lenin always held firmly to these principles, not only in theory but in practice. But if these principles are interpreted in a sectarian and mechanical way, with prescriptive intentions—as was done during the Stalinist period—the result runs counter to Lenin's aims: namely, to bring the artist closer to life, to develop a

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clearer and more deeply rooted view of reality, and to guarantee a true freedom of artistic creation.

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,*[3] published in 1909 and written after the temporary defeat of the Russian Revolution—a time rife with attempts to revise Marxism with new varieties of old subjective idealism—Lenin developed and enriched Marxist epistemology with his theory of reflection. In this work, Lenin does not deal with the relationship between art and science, nor does he at any length investigate art as a specific cognitive process. Nevertheless, we can infer from his analysis that art, like other agencies of ideology, is historically conditioned, although this does not preclude artistic truths from having an objective and extra-artistic validity.

Lenin thus cleared the way for discrediting the class subjectivism into which Marxist art theoreticians had fallen, and accordingly he made it possible to understand art as a particular reflection of reality. In no way did it follow that the Leninist theory of reflection could be transplanted automatically from the field of scientific knowledge, for which it was developed, to the realm of art; for the purposes of developing an aesthetic, there was no justification for assigning to this theory a central role, one that Lenin himself did not give it. But, beginning in the 1930s, most Soviet aestheticians attributed to Lenin's theory precisely such a role, to such an extent that it became the philosophical base of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics.

Actually, the concept of art as reflection is relevant only when discussing the cognitive function of art, or, more precisely, when this reflection possesses certain unmistakable characteristic features: the specificity of the reflected reality; the particular activity of the artist in the aesthetic field; the particular functions of the imagination, the senses, or the emotions; the process of thinking about these functions; etc. In sum, even in a work of art that reflects reality, artistic reflection differs radically from scientific reflection. That is why we cannot share the categorical views of such theoreticians as the Soviet author Boris Meilakh: "From Lenin's views on aesthetic problems in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* we can deduce, with ample evidence, that the general laws of the Marxist theory of reflection are also applicable, without alterations, to the field of art."[4]

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Once we identify the characteristic features of artistic reflection and the reality it reflects, we can begin to speak of the cognitive value of art. At the same time, we should not forget that in reflecting reality the artist reflects himself, and in the process his time and class as well, so that we cannot reduce art to its cognitive function, as indeed its history shows.

Lenin was well aware of this, and in his articles on Tolstoy he succeeded in resolving the subject-object relation in artistic creation, overcoming the sociological and subjectivist distortions of such theorists as Lafargue, Mehring, and Plekhanov. Without underestimating the subjective element in creative work, which is for the most part determined by the artist's world view, Lenin did not limit himself to a conception of art as a merely ideological expression; he emphasized instead that every great artist exceeds his ideological limitations to reveal a truth about reality.

To sum up, the Leninist theory of reflection is not the philosophical key to a Marxist aesthetic. Nevertheless, when it is used to analyze specific elements of artistic reflection and is not applied mechanically to aesthetics in general, it can contribute to an understanding of the relationship between the artist's world view and whatever truths about reality his work contains.

Artistic, Theoretical, and Practical Problems after the October Revolution

After the victory of the Revolution of October 1917, there was a growing demand for an art that responded to the needs of the men and women who were building a new society. As a result, the vital and pressing problems of artistic practice came to the fore. The need was felt for a new, revolutionary art, for new forms in which to express the vitality of a victorious ideology and the birth of a new society. The road was not easy: during the years immediately following the revolution there was an open struggle among diverse artistic trends, each with a different understanding of what this new art should be.

Lenin did not attempt to hide his personal taste in artistic matters but he was careful not to let his taste become a norm; he opposed any tendency of any group of artists toward a monopoly of artistic activity and refused to commit the revolu-

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tionary government to any official position on art, leaving the road open for artistic experimentation. Although he acknowledged that art has an ideological content and that it therefore plays a social and educational role, he was the first to recognize that art and politics operate on essentially different levels. It was in this spirit that shortly after Lenin's death the Bolshevik Party, in its 1925 resolution on the relationship between the party and literature, stated that "the class character of art in general and literature in particular is expressed in forms infinitely more varied than, for example, in politics."

In this way the party remained faithful to the Marxist thesis that art as an ideological form expresses class interests, without ignoring that—in view of the complex network of intermediary connections—art is not simply a direct and immediate expression of those interests. A. V. Lunacharsky, commissar of education from 1917 to 1929, was primarily responsible for carrying out the cultural and artistic policies of the new regime, and his approach to the momentous problems of creating a new art was greatly influenced by Marx's aesthetic ideas. A hotly debated question during those years concerned the value of the classical legacy in literature and art, and Lunacharsky—in the face of a quite prevalent nihilist desire to obliterate the past—frequently turned to Marx's reflections on the enduring appeal of the Greek classics and even more to his comments on the peculiarities of artistic development. In this open-minded and dynamic attitude to the values of the past, Lunacharsky was supported by Lenin; both were opposed to the "hothouse culture" of the Proletcult movement.

And yet it was Plekhanov, not Marx, who during the 1920s was considered the foremost authority on the theory of art. Marx's aesthetic ideas were seen primarily through a Plekhanovian prism. This resulted, as noted above, in "ideologizing," and in a sociological concept of art which dominated Marxist art and literary criticism in those years. The narrowness of this view made it impossible either to grasp the rich implications of Marx's aesthetic thought or to understand its organic relationship with his philosophical outlook.

In 1923 Lunacharsky proposed a revision of Marxism to accommodate aesthetic questions,[5] in a polemic with Denike, au-

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thor of an article entitled "Marx and Art." Mikhail Lifshitz—who in 1933 compiled the first anthology of texts by Marx and Engels on art and literature—noted that as late as 1929 the well-known Soviet historian Pokrovsky had said: "For quite some time we have had at our disposal a theory of historical process, but we have yet to develop a Marxist theory of artistic creation." Referring to Marxist contributions to that field, he added: "Except for certain works by Plekhanov and Mehring, we have nothing."[6]

The period between 1931 and 1933 was very important for the study and propagation of Marx's aesthetic ideas. Those years saw the publication of several key texts by Marx and Engels on the problem of literature: two of their early works, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology*—both, but especially the former, touching on basic aesthetic questions—appeared for the first time (the full texts were published in German, and selections in Russian); and Lifshitz and Schiller edited, with the active collaboration of Lunacharsky, the first anthology of writings by Marx and Engels, *On Literature and Art.* As a result, there was a renewed interest in Marx's aesthetic ideas; their integral role within Marxism as well as their relationship to previous aesthetic thought again began to be asserted. An indication of the renewed Marxist research in this field was Lifshitz's excellent *On the Problem of Marx's Ideas,* published in Russian at about the same time as his anthology.

However, the favorable conditions created in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, in which a thorough and creative study of Marx's aesthetic ideas might have provided the foundation for a scientific, open-minded, non-normative Marxist aesthetic, were seriously undermined when the Stalinist regime began to give rise to increasingly dogmatic, sectarian, and class subjectivist methods in aesthetic theory and artistic practice.

On Socialist Realism

Socialist realism was conceived, in different ways and from diverse artistic perspectives, during the mid-1930s. At its inception—and above all during its gestation period—it represented attempts to generalize and synthesize the artistic experiences

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accumulated after the October Revolution, and to respond definitively to the need for a new art, an art serving the new society and nourished by a socialist ideology. Its underlying assumption, clearly justified, was that the Marxist-Leninist world view placed the artist in a new relationship to things and people; and that consequently an art that was to reflect this new human and social reality needed new eyes. This led to a demand for a new realism that could reflect reality and its dynamism, development, and internal contradictions; it would of necessity have to be socialist. Even Lunacharsky, opposed as he was to a dogmatic and normative approach to art, joined this new movement, while making it very clear that he did not envision a realism with predetermined and rigid formal boundaries. On the contrary, he conceived of a socialist realism in which "fantasy, stylization, and every possible freedom of expression play a very important role in the depiction of reality."[7] He stressed that this new realism would employ "many different methods."

Two years before, in 1931, when opposing a trend toward stylistic uniformity, he had defended vigorously the right of artists to develop a realism without stylistic limitations. He felt that this was necessary to assure a great diversity "not only of genres but also of basic methods." It was in this spirit that Lunacharsky became an advocate of the new realism, which in his view would accommodate the most varied forms of expressing and reflecting reality.

However, when socialist realism became institutionalized on both the theoretical and practical levels, it began to close itself off behind increasingly rigid lines, causing such a deep schism between its content and its form that in many cases it became nothing more than a new content pumped into an old form. This contradiction, which never existed for Mayakovsky or Eisenstein, just as it never existed for Prokofiev, Eluard, Brecht, Alberti, or Siqueiros, tore into the very guts of an artistic theory and practice which had the potential to develop a radically new approach to both form and content.

This rigid conception of realism, allowing only one approach and closing the door on formal experimentation, ended any benefits that a new socialist art might draw not only from other artistic trends, whether alien or opposed to it, but also and

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above all from the formal breakthroughs that the new ideological content demanded. Moreover, the administrative and authoritarian interpretation of the Leninist thesis on the party spirit of a work of art in many cases put a damper on artistic freedom, transforming the vital inner urge to create into an external necessity, in a different context, with the kind of negative results that Marx had pointed out.

All of this led to a socialist realist aesthetic which ceased to postulate infinitely diverse ways of dealing with reality and began to establish norms and fix models, thus turning into a normative aesthetic, incompatible with the Marxist principles on which it pretended to base itself.

However, the dogmatism and sectarianism that imposed themselves on the relationship between art and reality in the name of socialist realism could in no way invalidate the legitimacy of an open, profound, and rich realism—a realism as broad and diverse as reality itself; a realism, moreover, which, far from finding Marxism-Leninism to be a restraint on its attempt to capture reality, found it instead to be the ideological perspective best suited to grasping the complexities and dynamics of reality. It was just this kind of realism that was engendered by the first films of Sergei Eisenstein and even, in the difficult years of the Stalinist period, by the novels of Mikhail Sholokhov.

Toward a Marxist Theory of Art

After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, the criticism of Stalin's dogmatic and sectarian methods led to the restoration of the forgotten or denatured Marxist-Leninist principles: efforts were made to enrich and revitalize them by reestablishing their bonds with social practice, with people's lives. This process of liberation from Stalinist dogmatism—the vital and creative assimilation and application of the fundamental theses of Marxism—has already yielded results, as much in the Soviet Union as elsewhere, in the study of the aesthetic ideas of Marx and Engels, and more generally in the analysis of the fundamental questions of a Marxist aesthetic which, using Marx's and Engels's ideas as a starting point, attempts to base itself firmly in artistic and social reality.

The return to the source—to Marx's ideas on the nature

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of aesthetics and art, to Engels's precise formulations on the relationship between ideological and socioeconomic phenomena—as well as the careful study of historico-artistic experience and of the complex artistic experience of our times: all this is contributing to the depth, diversity, and breadth of Marxist research in the field of aesthetics. It is necessary to point out that Marxist aestheticians from both socialist and capitalist countries have made important and relevant contributions and by their collective work have thus rejected the exclusively national manifestations that are proof of dogmatism in the universal field of aesthetics. As a matter of principle, Marxist aestheticians of all countries can and should contribute to the clarification and propagation of Marx's aesthetic ideas, and on the basis of these ideas lay the foundations for a true Marxist aesthetic, one constantly nourished by artistic experience, as diverse, complex, and contradictory as it may be.

NOTES

1. The best anthologies are those prepared by Mikhail Lifshitz, published in Russian in 1933, 1947, and 1948 (the latter also appeared in German in 1948). A two-volume edition was published in Russian by Iskusstvo in 1957 under the title *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: On Art*. Less expensive is an anthology prepared by Jean Fréville in French, *Karl Marx—Frederick Engels: Sur la littérature et l'art* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1954). The first edition of Fréville's volume has been translated into Spanish under the title *Sobre la literatura y el arte* (Mexico: Editorial Masas, 1938).
2. V. I. Lenin, "Party Organization and Party Literature," *Collected Works*, vol. 10 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962), p. 46.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism," in *Collected Works*, vol. 13 (New York: International Publishers, 1927).
4. Boris Meilakh, *Lenin and the Problems of Russian Literature* (Moscow, 1954); French edition (Paris, 1956), p. 203.
5. A. V. Lunacharsky, *In the World of Music* (Moscow, 1958), p. 224-225.
6. Mikhail Lifshitz, introduction to *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: On Art*, vol. 1, p. xi.
7. A. V. Lunacharsky, *Articles on Soviet Literature* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 238-239.

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HOW NOT TO ELIMINATE POVERTY

By Edward S. Herman and Richard B. Du Boff

The Retreat from Riches: Affluence and Its Enemies by Peter Passell and Leonard Ross. New York: Viking, 1973, $6.95.

The heart of this book is its argument for faster "economic growth" as "the only way in which America will ever reduce poverty." While this plea generally follows lines developed by the New (neo-Keynesian) Economists, *Retreat from Riches* marks a regression from the Heller-Okun doctrine of the 1960s, which placed great weight on the "growth dividend" that economic expansion can provide the government for social welfare outlays. Passell and Ross (hereafter PR) abandon the growth dividend in favor of a simple trickle-down from an expanding private sector alone, which makes it "more lucrative to wash cars or wait on tables today than it was twenty years ago." This is a throwback to a pre-depression, even nineteenth-century orthodoxy, which, as

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expressed by Stanley Jevons in 1883, held that "capital can hardly be accumulated and employed without vivifying industry, and diffusing comfort and subsistence through the whole body of society."

Retreat from Riches deserves attention not for its merits and substance, but rather as an index of the low estate of liberalism and the New Economics, and for the pernicious relevance of its message to current policy issues. In the 1930s Keynesians fought a battle for reform, urging both full-employment policies and larger public expenditures, in opposition to a powerful conservative orthodoxy. By the late 1950s, Keynesian techniques had been integrated into orthodox thought and a consensus had been established that made mass unemployment politically unacceptable, but in other respects the social message of the New Economists had been muted. In particular, they adapted readily to Cold War ideology, and for many of them military outlays came to be regarded as a quite acceptable (even superior) form of public expenditure.[1]* With *Retreat from Riches,* a further stage has been reached in which the main "enemy" of affluence and threat to unimpeded and beneficent growth are the environmentalists and their allies. Barry Commoner, J. K. Galbraith, and the members of the Club of Rome are the doubters against whom PR's shafts are principally aimed. This shift in orientation reflects an important if not dominant strand of liberal thought, PR's book being warmly greeted by leading New Economists in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and in a Foreword by Paul Samuelson, respectfully received in the *New York Review* (to which PR contribute regularly), and with its message conveyed without rebuttal in *The Nation* (Singer, "Population and Pollution, Do We Dare Grow?" [November 27, 1972]).

The further conservative turn of the New Economists has a clear bearing on the current environmental struggle, already intensified by the growing threat of pollution controls to business freedom of action and profits. The auto and petroleum industries are now fully mobilized for a "massive public relations and lobbying battle" to delay and weaken regulations for the control of automobile exhaust (according to the *Wall Street Journal* of April 12, 1973). Environmentalist opposition to drilling and exploitation of oil on the northern slope of Alaska and off-shore has infuriated oil company leaders—Gulf Oil's exploration manager recently blamed them for Gulf's enforced and costly termination of

* Notes will appear at the end of the article.

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drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel, "just because we dribbled some oil in the water." (*Wall Street Journal,* February 22, 1973) In this sharpening conflict it is of enormous value to the polluters that they can cite the message of two "young liberals" (as PR are described in two separate Mobil Oil Company advertisements) that only "growth" can abolish poverty. This message, in fact, may be said to constitute the real, public meaning of *Retreat from Riches.*[2] Whatever the intent of the authors, the single aspect of their work that will surely have the widest social consequences is the implication that anything that constrains "growth," such as obligatory pollution-control expenditures or more restricted drilling of Santa Barbara Channel oil, interferes with the "only way" we can solve the poverty problem, and can thus be said to be "at the expense of the poor."

Retreat from Riches is a strongly ideological work, in which conservative and opportunistically shifting premises and arguments adapt easily to foreordained conclusions. Indicative of the spirit of the book is the PR device of depicting opponents of their position as "elitists securing their room at the top." This may well be an application of the old adage that the best defense is a good offense, since their trickle-down approach to poverty, dismissal of income redistribution, and the enthusiastic reception of their arguments by Mobil Oil and Spiro Agnew (who lauded them at the Philadelphia Union League Club in May 1972) might suggest a touch of elitism in PR. In their Epilogue, PR contend: "All we argue is that the most favored few percent in our society should not project their attitudes on those materially less fortunate." This is a purely *ad hominem* argument, as is their slur against Galbraith, portrayed as an anti-growth elitist who retires comfortably to Switzerland "to write compositions on the evils of private consumption."[3] Not one shred of evidence is offered to show that personal advantage has played any role in the emergence of anti-growth viewpoints. (On the other hand, public praise for PR on the part of a giant corporation such as Mobil Oil *can* reasonably be assumed to reflect a calculation of corporate self-interest.)

All through their book PR formulate the growth-and-poverty issue as one of slowing down or accelerating growth within a fixed set of institutional arrangements. Thus, mass advertising and assiduously cultivated consumerism, the existing balance between public and private investment, and the present tax and expenditure structure, are all taken as givens. With such status quo premises the range of policy options, of course, shrinks to exceedingly narrow dimensions. But this is not done openly and frankly: PR never

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consider whether poverty might be more sharply reduced, and happiness enhanced, by basic institutional changes, with a stable or smaller GNP. (In his Foreword, Samuelson nevertheless recommends this book as a "careful audit of the costs and benefits accruing from different [sic] kinds of growth.") They dodge the issue in several ways: for one, they argue that the ordinary American has no frivolous expenditures and is barely making ends meet, with the implication that culturally established standards (affected by advertising, big car status, effects of unequal income distribution and a competitive, individualistic ethic) do not affect the satisfactions that growth can provide. In a different context, however, where the authors are extolling growth, they state that "the average income of the bottom tenth of the population has gone up about 55 percent since 1950," and that real income of the average American increased 15 percent in the 1960s alone. They never trouble to reconcile these achievements with their picture of the masses still struggling desperately to meet basic needs.[4]

Another device is to argue: "Growth . . . often reflects some unappetizing values. But for the most part it does not create those values." This is nothing but question-begging by authors unwilling to confront the going system of institutions and values. Even if growth creates no values, it reinforces those in existence, especially when they are congenial to entrenched economic interests. Beyond this, as several economists (Veblen, Galbraith, Mishan, Weisskopf) have stressed, the very logic of free-market economic growth is to keep creating wants faster than it satisfies them. Growth that depends on and promotes such a treadmill of frustration has built-in obstacles to fulfilling human aspirations and to solving the poverty problem. But this critically important question is referred to only once by PR and then abruptly dropped. The social function of "elite" consumption patterns that are deliberately flaunted in front of *all* citizens to whet their appetites for more and more "goods" is never discussed. Instead, the issue is dismissed as of interest only to "pop sociologists."

A third weapon in the PR arsenal is the opportunistic use of the political constraint. Although avowedly dedicated to the interests of the poor, PR judge income redistribution via political processes to be ruled out by hard-headed realities. Nixon's welfare proposal "remains mired in Congress. Explicit redistribution of income is still political anathema." That's that—no talk about urgency, "where there's a will there's a way," or anything else. When PR turn to pollution control, however, a political initiative not only becomes necessary to salvage growthmanship, it somehow

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becomes feasible. PR concede that to date the government has been ineffectual in preventing environmental destruction, mainly because the profit motive for polluting "seems recently to have intensified." Nonetheless, PR conclude that in *this* case effective control is indeed possible "if we have the political will to insist." Our "task" is "to break the bonds between profit and pollution"; pollution will be abated "when the government gets the gumption to enforce some tough laws. . . ." No longer is politics a *given,* defining the limits of policy, as it is with respect to income redistribution (where we have no "task" to break new ground and government "gumption" is not demanded). Uninterrupted economic growth requires effective pollution control; in principle such control is conceivable; therefore, we may assume it will be forthcoming.

The same use of shifting assumptions is evident in PR's treatment of America's role in the international economy. To begin with, the very inclusion of this subject in their book testifies to its contorted and makeshift character: opponents of U.S. imperialism are described as wanting to stop economic growth because they incorrectly believe that such growth depends upon continued American exploitation of underdeveloped countries. No case of this line of reasoning is cited; neither *Le Monde's* Claude Julien nor Lenin (the only names mentioned) is shown to be against growth as such. So far as American dependence on overseas expansion is concerned, the vital—and growing—concern of the U.S. leadership with foreign markets and raw materials is dismissed on the ground that we could "in principle" dispense with external economic ties at "modest" cost thanks to our internal wealth, with the aid of a few intelligent economic and political readjustments. This method of focusing on what we may call the "de-institutionalized theoretical possibility" has been utilized for years by the New Economists to show that a large military budget is not "necessary" for prosperity in America. Why the huge Pentagon budget is *there* and how its politics and economics interact to sustain its command over resources are ignored. In the same tradition PR tell us that our balance of payments is "utterly unworthy of the sacrifices of well-being that have been made in its name. International trade is a minor business for the United States . . . only 5 percent of GNP. . . . The economic insignificance of American trade underlines the perversity of the government's balance-of-payments obsession." But this "obsession" is not a given, even though firmly imbedded in the perceived interests of the business and political establishment. And here, as throughout the book, the

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political double standard is supported by invoking lofty GNP or profit aggregates to prove that by comparison any individual sector or industry in the economy is "minor," so that the worries it causes politicians are attributable to "a mixture of stupidity, misplaced internationalism, and private venality." This retreat to aggregates and an economy "too big" to be dominated by any single part, is a practice that Paul Samuelson might use as an illustration of the "fallacy of composition."

At times the PR method of proof by a combination of irrelevant aggregates plus rhetorical assertion approaches the "comically trendy," to borrow one of their many catchphrases. However attractive foreign investments and sales may appear to U.S. corporations, "they are in no sense *necessary* to the health and welfare of American capitalists." Not necessary, that is, if we ignore "obsessions," interests, and power. And if we disregard facts as well. "Exports," PR tell us, "play a modest role in American business, representing only a tiny fraction of total output. Chicago is a better market for computers than all of Southeast Asia."[5] In reality, by 1970 IBM was obtaining over half of its net profits from overseas operations, "a very exciting turning point in our history," according to IBM Chairman Thomas J. Watson.

Disregard for the realities of power, and fact, also underlie the authors' analysis of the current international financial crisis and problems of readjustment. PR grant that "because of the dollar's role as an international reserve currency," the United States "financed the foreign-currency needs of her military expansion in Asia and corporate expansion in both Europe and Asia (e.g., Korea) simply by spending dollars and letting others accumulate them." But the significance of this financial power escapes them. Not only are they unable to view the balance-of-payments problem in anything other than a narrow Keynesian perspective, they immediately launch into another "theoretical possibility" scenario: the Europeans could have balked the United States had they "shown any interest in stemming the flow of dollars. . . ." In addition to revealing that PR apparently can't tell a crisis when they see one staring them in the face, this discussion illustrates ignorance of some cardinal facts: by 1972 U.S. direct investment abroad had passed the $85 billion mark. The foreign-based sales it was producing were worth a conservative $200 billion, and, together with income from exports, they accounted for at least 20 percent of total U.S. corporate profits. *These* aggregates may not interest PR, but the American business community appears to think—and

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act—differently. Figures on U.S. foreign investment and sales might also help us understand why Nixon is fighting so hard to make the world safer for U.S. exports and tougher for those of Japan and Europe: as the dollar's key currency status crumbles, so does America's ability to finance its foreign investments and overseas military spending in the absence of large trade surpluses. Far from an irrational "obsession" or an excessive concern with "national prestige," Nixon's crusade to reverse the unfavorable U.S. balance of payments represents a defense of concrete economic and political interests, a fact obvious to casual readers of the business press or the *New York Times,* not to mention Japanese or European industrialists who are now bearing the brunt of Washington's trade offensive.

Likewise, the *fact* that we are becoming increasingly dependent on imports of oil and other foreign raw materials is brushed aside. Here, as in dealing with pollution control, PR resort to hypothetical future technology as the answer to problems that now appear threatening. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that our domestic industrial base and our export sector are becoming *more* reliant on "high technology products" which themselves require *greater* proportions of a few critical raw materials, many of which must now be imported. The business press reports that multinational corporations are "scouring the world" for sources of increasingly scarce raw materials, and estimates of future U.S. demands on external supplies continue to rise. The focus of *Business Week*'s Special Report on "The Scramble for Resources" (June 30, 1973) is precisely "the nation's growing dependence on foreign materials." Yet for PR "technology continues to widen the opportunities to substitute plentiful materials for scarce ones," and is freeing our economy "from dependence on foreign resources."[6] Within a year of publication of this optimistic statement a unique national crisis had been precipitated by a small curtailment of external supplies of oil (reflecting the narrowing margin of energy supplies available to a growing world economy).

Corporate business admittedly is becoming more growth-oriented than ever before, with "growth" defined in terms of a steady expansion of sales and profits. But PR inform us that pollution could be eliminated by technologies that might add "only about 10 or 15 percent to cost." Try convincing Henry Ford, Carl Gerstacker, or any other corporate chieftain to absorb such a bagatelle either by reducing profits, tampering with prices and sales for reasons unconnected with output and profit maximization, or

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scaling down his growth horizons to accommodate antipollution investments. The same can be said for the observation that "if the task of cleaning up is organized efficiently, the costs of high standards of air and water quality will be bearable—certainly less than one-tenth of GNP, the amount added by two good years of growth."[7] Bearable for whom? Can it be assumed that this large volume of resources will be diverted to wholesome social ends because the entire citizenry would benefit? The history of the disappearance of past "growth (and peace) dividends" indicates that the answer is a flat "no," and nothing in *Retreat from Riches* suggests the contrary. And here also, within a year of publication, PR's Panglossian optimism on pollution control was rendered pathetic by the impact of "growth" on the price and availability of energy sources. *Business Week,* reporting on administration and business responses to the shortages (November 17, 1973), finds "solidly based" the "continuing fear that the environmental gains of the last four years will be gutted by concern over the energy crisis."

PR display little interest in, or insight into, the *Geist* of the corporate and banking sectors, an error of omission that should serve as an object lesson for social scientists and political activists probing the relationships among economic growth and its negative by-products, business behavior, interest-group conflicts, and the role of the state in capitalist society. Like so many other conventional economists, PR scrupulously avoid coming to grips with how big business actually operates—how corporations formulate goals, execute policies, perceive threats, and fight back to survive and expand. Quite significantly, in nine pages of source notes, there is a striking absence of reference to the business press—none at all to *Business Week* and exactly one *Wall Street Journal* citation (and that a quote of former Treasury Secretary John Connally). There are, by contrast, repeated citations of New Economists (Schultze, Cooper, Okun, Tobin, Samuelson). Furthermore, the overriding economic fact of our day—the tremendous concentration of economic power in the hands of a few hundred giant corporations and banks—passes virtually unnoticed, and is certainly not allowed to influence the PR argument.

It should be evident by now that PR provide no systematic analysis of the growth-poverty relationship anywhere in their book, even though this is what their work supposedly is about. Though growth and a rising GNP are the PR solution to poverty, nowhere do these authors explain why substantial poverty and unhappiness persist in a country with a huge GNP and many decades of im-

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pressive growth. They concede that growth may not reduce inequality or restrain consumerism, but (as we have seen) they carefully avoid considering how this affects human well-being. Poverty, which growth presumably can eliminate, is nowhere defined by PR, but they tend toward an absolute rather than relative concept—of necessity, since relative deprivation can and does increase under free-market growth. As Marx observed in "Wage-Labor and Capital" (1847):

> A house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut. The little house shows now that its owner has only very slight or no demands to make; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighboring palace grows to an equal or even greater extent, the dweller in the relatively small house will feel more and more uncomfortable, dissatisfied and cramped within its four walls.

Recent evidence on subjective evaluations of standards of living and how they are affected by economic growth—absolutely none of which finds its way into the world of PR—has been carefully sifted in a paper by Richard Easterlin.[8] In successive income groups from low to high within a given country, Easterlin finds, the proportion of people considering themselves "very happy" rises steadily. However, at least for the United States there is no clear association between economic growth and happiness over the 1946 to 1970 period: while the "very happy" proportion of the population drifted upward to around 1957, it fell noticeably between 1957 and 1970. In the late 1960s all income classes showed a decline in happiness, so that by 1970 there was no class in which happiness was higher than it was in 1963 (despite a 29 percent jump in real per capita disposable incomes). Easterlin tentatively concludes that

> there is a "consumption norm" which exists in a given society at a given time, and which enters into the reference standard of virtually everyone. This provides a common point of reference in self-appraisals of well-being, leading those below the norm to feel less happy and those above the norm, more happy. Over time, this norm tends to rise with the general level of consumption. . . . If the view suggested here has merit, economic growth does not raise a society to some ultimate state of plenty. Rather, the growth process itself engenders ever-growing wants that lead it ever onward.

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Any study of the objective social effects of postwar economic growth in the West would show, we believe, that rapid growth in today's "free" market systems tends to consolidate the power of affluent classes and top business decision-makers, who benefit most from "consumerism" and find it advantageous to promote it—public sector decay, urban blight, environmental degradation, and human alienation notwithstanding. If growth yields more than proportionate economic benefits and political power to these people, it should in turn strengthen their control over resource allocation, reinforce our "high mass-consumption" culture, and further reduce the likelihood that higher per capita incomes will lessen relative deprivation and leave more people contented. These relationships make it easy to understand why, after a decade of robust growth in Europe and North America, so many things seem to be getting worse and why public opinion polls in France, for example, show that half the population believes that its "quality of life" has deteriorated over the past five years. Such is the predictable outcome of economic growth that adds muscle to socially retrogressive institutions and tightens the stranglehold that private profit-making collectivities (chiefly major corporations) continue to exercise over our economic, political, and cultural life.

The political naiveté (or opportunism) of economists who count on growth and its "dividend" to cope with social problems is evident not only in the collapse of the Great Society, where the $40 billion increase in government revenues resulting from the 1964 tax cut went not for the "war on poverty" but for the assault on Vietnam, it is likewise visible in the spreading decay of cities, public transportation, and other urban amenities throughout North America and Western Europe during the past decade of rapid quantitative economic growth. A study of growth in Western Europe during the 1960s by European Economic Community economist Michel Albert shows that the nations with the highest rates of GNP growth turned in the poorest performances in the public sector (outputs of collective goods such as medical and health facilities, low-cost housing, mass transport, and so forth). Albert's findings provide a further explanation for a perverse relationship between free-market growth and social betterment: the combination of increasingly conservative politics and more severe inflationary pressures leads to cutbacks in public outlays, especially those that benefit the politically weak (that is, the poor).

A growing body of political economic analysis and empirical evidence, then, points to the conclusion that growth *per se* is an unreliable means for eliminating poverty (however defined), that

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it fails to reduce and may even increase relative deprivation, and that it poses a potentially catastrophic threat to our natural environment. It confirms what common sense tells us—that neither the eradication of poverty nor an adequate environmental policy is likely to be achieved as the side-effect of policies with other objectives ("growth" in this case), which leave the existing distribution of economic and political power intact. The only way to attain such goals is by pursuing them *directly*—by building them into the economic process from the very beginning.

NOTES

1. This earlier evolution of Military Keynesianism is described in Du Boff and Herman, "The New Economics: Handmaiden of Inspired Truth," *The Review of Radical Economics* (August 1972).
2. As the late Leo Rogin observed, "The objective meaning of the economic theories which have challenged the attention of society is to be discovered in the uses to which they are put. The orientation of these theories to the external context of social issues invests them with a public, hence objective character." Leo Rogin, *The Meaning and Validity of Economic Theory* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 10.
3. Another anti-elitist who uses the same device as PR is Edward Heath, Conservative Prime Minister of England. In a speech on March 27, 1973, before the Annual Conference of the Federation of Conservative Students, while extolling free-market growth as *his* choice for solving Britain's social problems, the Prime Minister noted that "it is easy to scoff at these new opportunities [accruing to the masses from growth] if you enjoy them already."
4. In 1958 James Tobin (to whom *Retreat from Riches* is dedicated) decried the development of new consumer goods, "all to be marketed by the most advanced techniques of mass persuasion to a people who already enjoy the highest and most frivolous standard of living in history." This statement was made before the surge of growth and rise in per capita incomes of the past decade and a half. It was also made in a context of an appeal for higher military outlays! (See further, *op. cit.*, note 1 above.)
5. This highly misleading statement was made in these very same words by Passell in the *New York Times Book Review* (January 23, 1972). A communication to the *Review* pointing out that and other gross errors was unpublishable for lack of space! It is interesting to note, also, that distinguished New Economists Samuelson and Solow (who wrote an accolade to PR in—where else?—the *New York Times Book Review* [February 25, 1973]), despite their commitment to scientific rigor, find a shoddy work like *Retreat from Riches* deserving of uncritical support. Apparently the PR "message" appeals to them, as it does to Mobil and Spiro.

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6. For a more extended discussion of this and other points treated in these paragraphs, see Du Boff and Herman, "Corporate Dollars and Foreign Policy," *Commonweal* (April 21, 1972).
7. Prime Minister Heath uses identical reasoning: "Some say that the price for such achievements is that our environment will be further despoiled by the growth of industry. . . . But this need not be true. Economic growth gives us more resources to use for improving the quality of our environment." (See above, note 3.)
8. "Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence," in P. A. David and M. W. Reder, eds., *Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

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An Attica Brothers Speakers Bureau has been recently put together as a vital component of the defense of the Attica Brothers and as a means of educating the public to what happened at Attica on September 9-13, 1971, why it happened, and what has been happening since.

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For further information, get in touch with Ann Clark at:

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(*Continued from inside front cover*)

can send it to us and we will see that it is put to good use.

As this issue goes to press, we are in the process of completing the move to new quarters. Please note the new address: 62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011 (half a block east of our present location). The telephone number remains the same: 212-691-2555.

If we repeat ourselves in this space from time to time, it is because there seems to be a need for it. Both the magazine and the press receive far more manuscripts than we can accept for publication. Except where the subject matter is obviously outside of MR's scope, we try to read them all, though there are cases, especially with respect to book-length manuscripts, in which we enlist the assistance of outside readers better qualified than we are in a particular field. It is also our policy, even if not always lived up to, to communicate personally with authors and as much as possible to include comments and criticisms. All this of course takes a lot of time, and when the inflow of manuscripts is heavy, as it has been lately, we unavoidably fall behind, with a resultant lengthening of the average time between receipt of manuscript and communication to author. The delays tend to be particularly long in the case of article manuscripts which are much in excess of our "standard" length of around 15 double-spaced typed pages. The moral is that if you want to submit something to us *and* maximize the chances of its being accepted *and* minimize the delay in hearing from us, it is a good idea to be sure it falls within MR's scope and to keep it short.

The November 1973 issue of *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (c/o Bay Area Institute, 604 Mission St., Room 1001, San Francisco, Cal. 94105) carries an article by Mark Selden entitled "Imperialism and Asia: A Brief Introduction to the Literature" which contains bibliographical information of a kind we are often asked for and which should be useful to many MR readers. Under "Selected Periodical Sources," Mark Selden lists MR with the generous notation: "For 25 years the richest source on the dynamics of U.S. capitalism and world imperialism." We hope the characterization is justified.

Peoples Translation Service (2490 Channing Way, Berkeley, Cal. 94704) is a collective dedicated to providing reasonably priced translation services to the U.S. Left. PTS also offers a regular "Feature Service" presenting translations of articles selected by the members of the collective themselves and occasional Foreign Alternative Press Listings which are catalogues of articles appearing in a wide variety of foreign periodicals and available for translation. We have used the services of PTS with satisfactory results. For information on prices, subscription rates, etc., write directly to the above address or call 415-549-1949.

A couple of years ago MR Press published *Unequal Exchange*, by Arghiri Emmanuel, a book which had already aroused much interest in Europe (it was originally published in French). That this is also happening in this country is indicated by the following announcement which we have been asked to make: "The Institute for Radical Studies (P.O. Box 9146, Denver, Col. 80209) is interested in organizing a symposium on the work of Arghiri Emmanuel. Anyone interested is invited to write to the Institute. Ideas would also be appreciated."

From time to time we receive a bequest from a reader who felt, in his or her lifetime, that financial support would help make possible the continuance of MR as a completely independent socialist magazine. Those wishing to follow this example should be careful to state exactly in their wills that the bequest is to "Monthly Review, Inc., of 62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011."

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